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The Multi Side Marketplace (MSM) is an invention of internet era. The
MSM arises from a confluence of different services and portals, which started
the Web revolution. When compared with the village market and the tradi-
tional brick-and-mortar store, the platform offers the capability to integrate
different market sectors in a unique paradigm. For example, Amazon, Face-
book, Uber, Netflix and other companies create value through different busi-
ness models involving several requirements, oriented towards more than merely
satisfying consumer needs. Indeed, they scrape and collect a large amount of
information for learning the market opportunities beyond selling a good, for
releasing collateral frameworks, far from main tasks (such as a tool to design
web components or Content Management System).
Generally speaking, online platforms are matchmakers. David S. Evans and
Richard Schmalensee1 describe such platforms as facilitating good matches be-
tween two sides: one that sells and another that buys. This is simple when the
match involves two agents, but can became complex when are more. To this
end, it is useful to show an example reported by Rysman about externalities
generated by the main process: "In the case of a video game system, the inter-
mediary is the console producer—Sony in the scenario above—while the two
sets of agents are consumers and video game developers. Neither consumers
nor game developers will be interested in the PlayStation if the other party is
not"2. The multi-side nature of the platform must control the mutual inter-
actions between parties, not only to increase mutual benefits, but also in the
case in which they have neutral or adverse purposes. The capability to match
a very large number of agents (sellers, buyers, social media users, advertisers,
software developers, etc.), under the constraint to control the compliance, is
often a search problem. Contrary to village markets, platforms use match-
ing algorithms facing toward this goal. The search algorithm formalizes an
issue that only a single user was capable of previously in retailing: reducing
time and increasing the best match quality. However, the search algorithms
digest information and need a large quantity of information in order to match
well. The more information they have characteristics of regarding the agents
and goods, the better the search ranking and the lower the search costs for
all. Platforms such as Google, Amazon, Facebook continue to ingest more
and more information at an ever increasing rate, but this operation has a
1Evans, David S., and Richard Schmalensee. Matchmakers: The new economics of mul-
tisided platforms. Harvard Business Review Press, 2016.
2Rysman, Marc. "The economics of two-sided markets." Journal of economic perspectives
23.3 (2009): 125-43.
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cost. Platforms have by-passed this issue, promising benefit for the consumer,
in exchange for uploading free contents, so-called User Generated Contents
(UGC) without making explicit what was implicit. For example, the UGC
are often compared with the Public good (non-excludable and non-rivalrous3)
without a compliant model of public good (eg.: conceptualized by a game or
a behavioral experiment). Although it does not completely reach this goal,
the novelty of our work proceeds through a formal approach to decode the in-
formative signals of UGC, to demonstrate their usefulness in product search.
This regards both achieving more product variety in less time and exploiting
a decision making mechanism to help the consumer best match their taste. In
details, each chapter is focused on the quality-price relationship. The first one
investigates the concept of product quality, trying to capture its endogenous
qualities and convert them into an index. The second exploits this index to-
ward searching and ranking processes, formulating a decision mechanism able
to suggest the optimal choice. The last one analyzes a competition between
sellers with respect to the price proposed through a dropping price tactic.
We present the work Product quality of platform markets, in which we propose
a product quality index based on UGC, whose insights have been captured by
means of Machine Learning and Natural Language Processing framework. This
framework has been customized to set a non-trivial improvement in informa-
tion analysis from economics point of view. The aim of this index is to drive
consumers’ choices for finding trustworthy signals of actual quality, enhancing
a timeless response to their searches. We have shown how our quality index
can improve product price differentiation, applying our model to a sample
of electronic camera products. The paper was written with Michela Chessa
(Université Côte d’Azur). The second work, Optimizing Product Quality in
online Search, is the result of a collaboration between myself, Anna Bottasso
(Università di Genova) and Michela Chessa (Université Côte d’Azur). In this
article we have described a model of consumer sequential search for prod-
ucts, exploiting a decision making mechanism based on a Stopping Rule. We
show how the consumer can optimize their search strategy, demonstrating an
improvement in terms of consumer utility at different levels of price, with re-
spect to a rating-based search mechanism. The original aspect of the work is
the adoption of a Statistical Learning algorithm, to define a new endogenous
concept of quality, set as the core of the searching process. The final chap-
ter, a collaboration between myself, Anna Bottasso (Università di Genova)
and Simone Robbiano (Università di Genova), is Price Matching and Platform
Pricing. The study refers to the price strategy where different retailers com-
mit themselves to match any lower price offered by competitors on the same
item or the product category. While such guarantees are widespread policies
among retailers, in literature there is no consensus on the view that low-price
guarantees are used to effectively discourage price cutting, but rather they
3[Users cannot be barred from accessing and/or using them for failing to pay for them.
Meaning that their use by one person does not affect others’ ability to use them, and users
cannot be prohibited from their use by failure to pay for them.
4
encourage anti-competitive behaviors. In the paper we empirically investigate
the effects of price matching guarantees on U.S. consumer electronics online
marketplace, by means of a unique dataset developed through sophisticated
and computerized scraping procedures.
In sum, in this thesis we present three papers which investigate informative
content generated by consumers, aiming to improve the usefulness for match-
ing high quality products at lower prices. Following a general perspective, we
explore platform product listing, searchable through a decision making mech-
anism. In a more specialized perspective, we take into account a dropping
price modality service, differentiating the consumer benefit in the case of high
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0 Chapter 1
Product quality on platform markets
Abstract
Many studies have questioned the meaning of “product quality”, hanging be-
tween a characteristic interpretation of a product for improving consumer sat-
isfaction, and scientific approach to measure its benefits. Starting from the
historical quality setting as mirror image of the price, we investigate the adop-
tion of new signals, developed over the years to adjust the original relationship.
Recently, bootstrapping by emperor of e-commerce platforms, the rating system
has emerged as a reference contribute for product quality informativeness. We
study this tendency, to show its failure in the presence of low price market
and new brands. For this purpose, we collect User Generated Contents from
a well-known online retailing platform. We capture and distill meaningful fea-
tures in order to adjust the rating assigned by reviewers, and propose a novel
quality formula able to increase the accuracy of the information provided to the
consumer. We suggest that our formula better captures product quality, and,
when adopted by a platform for sorting the products, it increases the products
variety and, consequently the satisfaction of the consumer. Our proposal sug-
gests a way to facilitate the consumer search (as we will show in the second
chapter). Moreover, it can be used as a measure of market efficiency in the
case of voluntary opacity of the platform in exposing product quality signals.
1 Introduction
Price and quality are the main pivotal indices that play a relevant role in
product managing. Historically, most of the problems in estimating the qual-
ity arise from the very real difficulty of even reaching a consensual meaning of
the word "quality", for which there are a multitude of definitions. An histori-
cal product quality definition is that approved by the International Standards
Organization (ISO). According to this definition, quality is the totality of fea-
tures and characteristics of the product or service that bear on its ability to
satisfy stated or implied needs revolving around customer 4. This definition
focuses the attention on quality as a key attribute of some product features,
as they are discovered by the consumer, such as design, conformance, and
other parameters of fitness for use. "Consumer Reports", a magazine which
4Mentioned in The ISO 8402-1986 standard protocol. ISO is an international standard-
setting body composed of representatives from various national standards organizations,
founded in 1947.
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represents the point of reference for testing products5, has standardized and
shared the information about these features since 1936. This magazine has
become a point of reference for consumers and scholars whose interest is in the
correspondence between price and quality, producing a rich statistical source
of multi-dimensional indices. This information has also played a crucial role in
discovering violations of federal laws and norms, such as for the scandal related
to the Volkswagen in 20116. With the rise of Web platforms, a much larger
information set about product features has started to be easily at disposal
of every consumer. The phenomenon of the influence of reviewers’ opinions
on consumer choice is nowadays present on a much larger scale, thanks to
the so-called User Generated Contents (UGC). Our work tackles the issue of
proposing a new way to measure quality, i.e., a new quality index, which is
based on UGC. Our index inherits the current and common perspective to
adopt the rating as a basic signal for quality, but complements it by taking
into account other key variables that can be extracted from the large amount
of information available online. We investigate information that is made avail-
able by the online platforms and define some key features. First, the already
mentioned rating. Secondly, the number of likes (Thumb Up/Down), also
called votes, which evaluate the trustability of the reviews and the reputation
of the writer. The votes represent the response of a large public to accept/deny
the rating decided by a small population of reviewers. Other signals extracted
from the text content evaluate when the votes are representative of the review,
in particular when they infer the reviewer reputation (eg.: the length and den-
sity of the review). Taking quality as the simple mirror image of the price,
scholars in the seventies developed studies to analyze other variables. In the
eighties, the simple alignment price/quality questioned, extracting the tangible
components whose quality was the manifestation of labor, design, durability,
marketing investments and so forth. The advertising expenditure played an
increasingly important role in the nineties, when shopping has landed on line,
and grew up the capability to track different signals, mixing ADV cost, price
and effective purchasing. In the new millennium, the upsurge of large-scale
operators such as the platforms of retailing, has upgraded the opportunities
to find out product information and to dive deeply in the details (big/small
brands, variety of market categories, and so forth), and consumer perceptions
(thrustability and consensus). The digital economy opened the doors to the
so called Big Data analysis, without worrying anymore about how to manage
all the information. It became one of the main tasks of researchers in digital
economics to investigate this “mare magnum” to reach useful fragments of hid-
5Consumer Reports (CR) is an American nonprofit consumer organization dedicated to
unbiased product testing, investigative journalism, consumer-oriented research, and con-
sumer advocacy.
6At the starting of controversy involving Volkswagen not regular emission mode, there
has been a test of Consumer Report in 2011 (focused on the car "Jetta SportWagen TDI").
Volkswagen admitted to using the defeat device, and has been ordered to recall approxi-
mately 482,000 cars. United States federal penalties have been severe, including fines ranging
up to US $18 billion.
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den information, able to reveal market and product insights. Our work renews
the canonical adoption of product features, as we will discuss in the related
literature, but in a completely new format, as the confluence of economics and
other branches of science. We adopt processes involving the capture of hetero-
geneous information (like quantitative values and linguistic text) that typically
concerned computer science research, that only recently have been the instru-
ments of economics analysis. The text analysis is the principal task of Natural
Language Processing (NLP) tools, which transform linguistic information to
a vector space, offering the possibilities to merge and integrate values coming
from different kinds of data sources. Using these tools we have the possibility
to discover, create and collect different product attributes in order to create
a function able to explain a trustable quality index. For example, we have
calculated the relevance of the reviewer’s reputation, through the estimation
of the link between votes and text reviews’. Also, we have discovered that a
review’s length is another important factor for the consumer’s attention, but
up to a certain threshold, above which the reading is interrupted. This paper
aims to answer the following research question: how is it possible to adjust
a canonical quality index, such as the rating, submitting it to a revision of
trustability? Our solution suggests a method based on public endorsement.
We capture the best features are able to settle the study just explained, ob-
tained through a feature selection mechanism endogenous to the quality index
computation. We provide results about the relationship between the price and
our quality index, and we offer guidelines which are useful to evaluate the effi-
ciency of the market and to set new policies for public intervention, especially
in the case of voluntary opacity of platforms in exposing quality information.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. The following Section 2
reviews the literature on product quality, also drafting around the collection
and distillation of the UGC ingredients, retrievable on the platforms. In Sec-
tion 3 we present what a UGC is in detail, and why and how it can be useful
for a quality evaluation, in particular on the inefficiency of the rating system.
Section 4 presents the data collection, the features extraction and descriptive
statistics. In Section 5 we present how our detailed reviews data are handled
through statistical learning algorithms, in order to select the main important
features and to define the new product quality formula. Section 6 concerns
our quality index, bringing out the experimental evidence and discussing the
empirical results, comparing a selection which is sorted by rating with a new
one which is sorted based on our quality index. Section 7 concludes. The
details about features list and statistical learning sections have been moved to
Appendices.
2 Related literature
The difficulty meaning of "quality", gave rise to doubts about the uniqueness
of the definition. For example, Holbrook and Corfman[24], in the eighty, ex-
plored the literature about the concept of quality in various disciplines. The
disparity among the different definitions collected by the authors, suggests
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the obstacles to a conceptualization and reflect a failure to distinguish quality
from other types of values as beauty, convenience, and fun. Concerning the
consumer expectations, the question reflects linguistic performance in the ac-
tual usage of the term to describe consumption experiences. Taking a similar
direction, Hjorth-Andersen[26], in the same years, analyzes the difference be-
tween mono and multi-dimensional index of quality, in order to capture the
inefficiency of the consumer market clear representation of the price as an in-
dicator of quality. The author compares works aligned to price as quality, with
other ones in opposition. The conclusions show the relevance of the relation-
ship price-quality, sustained by a richer quantity of multi-dimensional index
data, extended to more categories. Fundamental for the research is the use
of the dataset of product features of "Consumer Reports Magazine"7. Curry
and Riesz[12] try to trace a correspondence of price and quality over time, here
too, using empirical data reported in "Consumer Reports magazine" from Jan-
uary 1961 through December 1980. Unlike the research of Hjorth-Andersen,
focused on the number of features and the complexity of information to de-
fine product properties, Curry and Riesz adopt as guidelines three theoretical
hypotheses about product pricing policy: PLC (product life cycle) theory, dy-
namic pricing policy, and economic information theory. Through this model,
the authors capture certain structural demand characteristics that directly in-
fluence consumer behavior and indirectly producer strategy. The results show
a compliance the PLC theory, in which prices converge to an optimal level of
price and quality over the years, as well as decrease in price variation, appar-
ently due to a close level of prices by competitors.
In the nineties, the correspondence between price and quality was criticized
aggressively by different authors, among them Philip Crosby [11], who has
explored in which way different processes of manufacturing and distribution
can change the price, maintaining the same quality level. The new perspec-
tives have overpassed the previous approach, taking into account a relationship
between production cost and prediction of demand, focusing attention brand
competition, return of investment and capability to evaluate product impact.
All these issues conveyed product quality information on marketing, in partic-
ular the advertising power to affect the consumer decisions. The perspective,
formalized by Milgrom and Roberts [36], is that sellers of high quality goods
will spend more on advertising because they will benefit from an increment
of potentially happy buyers. The decontextualized pair price-quality therefore
entails a correction, due to the quality perceived by the user under the influ-
ence of advertising. This assumption is more evident for big brands, equipped
by large power of spending, able to amortise the ADV costs, favoured by a
rich amount of product differentiation.
7Quoting Hjorth-Andersen, the insights of reviews concern: "The characteristics (at-
tributes) that a rational consumer would expect from the ordinary use of a given commodity.
In a given test (article) in this magazine, a number of variants (brands) is tested on a set
of selected characteristics and graded from very poor to excellent".
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In the first years of new millennium, the Google ADV8 revolution, based on
Ad-words strategy9 and the consequent bootstrapping of On-line markets, cre-
ated the conditions for a precise estimation of ROI (Return On Investment)
due to the marketing expenditure. Since the search product cost became
embedded in the mechanism (more ADV investment = more probability to
reach the product in less time), the perceived quality benefits the big brand.
This asymmetry enhances the discrimination between small brands and the
dominant ones (different authors have learned this phenomenon such a case
of rich-then-richer tendency, in particular Brynjolfsson[8]). High expenditure
sellers, able to minimize manufacturing cost and distribution opportunities, re-
ceive higher rankings and more visibility, which improve the chances to show
high quality products. Following this new perspective, users participate with
more attention to the analysis of quality. Quality became related not only
to price attributes, but to several not-price signals, released by platform and
available from the users. For example: verbose product description, opinions
written directly by users, statistical information about the ranking list, rec-
ommendations for similar products, and so forth. Attempts at the complex
and cumbersome nature of real price, is revealed by Piccone and Spiegler [41],
whose work analyzes how firms can choose a ’format’ in which is shown the
price, giving consumers hard time for choosing a default firm. This amount of
information new issues: helping but building a labyrinth of discorded signals,
which prevent clarifying the right relation price-quality.
In his seminal article, Bolton[3] attempts to orient the consumer in this labyrinth,
actually comparing trading in a market with online feedback to markets with-
out. The results confirm that the feedback mechanism induces an improvement
in transaction efficiency, leveraging benefits typical of public goods, in which
the whole community of consumers takes part. Nowadays, the main resources
of feedback are the UGC, that the customer can upload to the retailing plat-
form after purchasing a product, distinguished by the technical specification
and description put forth by the manufacturer. The more popular and shared
UGC are the product reviews, split in two basic signals, a quantitative one,
the rating, and a qualitative, the textual information centered around product
features. Briefly, the platforms replicate the content product type inherited
by the classical "Consumer Reports" magazine, mentioned in the seventies by
the literature about product quality. From the nebula of information shown
before, the simplest quantitative universal value is the rating, elected by users
to become the big product quality proxy.
Different papers published in the 2000s take note of this tendency. As Cheva-
lier and Mayzlin [9] demonstrate, the rating can significantly influence buyers’
behavior and have a substantial impact on the success or failure of a product.
8Advertising
9Google Ads is an online advertising platform launched by Google, where advertisers bid
to display textual and image advertisements, service offerings, product listings and others.
The winner formula of Ads is simple but very efficient, because it is optimized for a very
controlled chain such web services: more marketing investment increased product visibility,
more probability purchasing.
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Other authors argue that the rating can be used for predicting future sales, tak-
ing in argument the product quality: Dellarocas et al.[14]. The next decade
heralds a certain skepticism, since the rating system is not blind to assure
trustability and reliability of product opinions. Basically, at the beginning,
"The Consumer Report" was born as a baseline for a no-profit organization
to advocate for the consumer in legislative areas. Whereas the platforms are
private corporations, some of them of trillion of dollars. This is an important
reason as to why the reviews mechanism and the rating system require fur-
ther checks. This problem is put in relevance by Lafky[30] who designs an
experiment to understand if consumers are motivated to rate by a concern for
helping the community of future customers, or just showing gratitude/anger
that they feel towards online merchants. In the first case their behaviour
could be explained as a signal of an altruism attitude, whereas in the second
one, they can obtain some economic incentives, due the hope of getting some
agreement with the sellers (it is known that in marketing campaigns, there
is a mechanism of reviews paid by sellers). In the experiment the payoffs of
raters are manipulated, to observe who helps the buyer or awaits a benefit
from the seller. The conclusions explore rating policies, in order to make the
rating decision transparent and not imitative.
Some authors, such as Li, Tadelis and Zhou[34] suggest some cases, in which
a reputation system controlled by platforms in an automatic and unsuper-
vised way, is able to provide an embedded solution toward the information
trustability, in particular for the rating. They evaluate the sellers reputation,
generated by consumer feedback due to a new mechanism design. In this de-
sign, a Machine Learning algorithm learns how to optimize the UGC signals
using a “reward-for-feedback" (RFF) mechanism: the sellers suggest a qual-
ity level, the buyers can confirm or not. An anonymous process finds the best
match. Rietsche at al.[42] have recently proposed a more generalized checking.
For the vast majority of the authors, the relevant factors of feedback, assuring
for trustability, function both as the signal of the review and the information
related to the reviewer’s profile.
Our research goes in the direction to search trusted signals and to analyze
density and accuracy of textual information, in order to adjust the rating to
reach a more accurate quality index. Recently, a ML approach to distill and
classify reviews information has spread, in conjugation with Natural Language
Processing (NLP) tools, enabling the transformation of qualitative signals into
quantitative ones. This approach, typical of Computer Science during the last
two decades, has started to take roots in economics fields. In different eco-
nomic research areas have taken advantage from NLP and ML tools, to face a
new challenge text information management. Gentzkow et al.[20] have recently
proposed a wide survey of this trend. In light of this, we add our contribution
in the development area of language engineering.
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3 UCG contents and main features
In this section we publicly the structure and the information which it is possible
to extract from a UGC, provided on a platform. This stage is necessary because
it is a panoramic approach to looking for the useful signals to create the new
quality index. By UGC we intend textual (linguistic or quantitative) content
that is uploaded by users on an online platform, in the form of free giving 10.
A UGC item is composed by rating, votes and textual content. There are two
main agents involved in this process: the reviewer writes the textual content
and rates the products, and the voters who evaluate the reviewer’s action,
through a Thumb Up/Down mechanism. The rating is the judgment that a
user (origin) gives to another agent of the platform (target: brand, product or
other users) about a certain interaction that occurred between them. In our
analysis, we take into account ratings to a given product. More trustworthy
systems like professional sites are characterized by the presence of an authority
who governs the collection and storage of user’s ratings. Conversely, several
on-line retailers, like Amazon, E-bay and others do not distinguish between
certified and amateur contributions. The textual content is the description
and the opinions of the reviewer about the characteristics of the product. We
often refer to the couple rating-textual context as to a review. Consumer
votes represent the Thumb Up/Down mechanism adopted by the consumer to
approve or reject a review, shown by the vast majority of on-line retailers at
the bottom/top of each review. In particular we consider the ratio between the
positive votes and the total votes received by each review. The votes represent
helpful feedback to weight the rating of each review, confirming or denying its
validity. A reviewer provided by many positive votes enjoys a high reputation.
We underline that the text and the rating are a double-signal which orients
the consumer in its choices about the product, where the vote represents a
kind of helpfulness of the pair (rating, text). This is granular information by
a large number of consumers (roughly 20 times more than the reviewers). It
represents an acceptance or a rejection of the reviewers’ opinion.
3.1 Inefficiency of rating
The rating system as main quality signal, as it is designed in the vast majority
of platforms, underlies some inefficiencies. We list here the main factors of
such inefficiency.
As first factor, we may observe that in many cases the rating distribution is
flat. The standard platform policies show the average rating of a certain prod-
uct, using a scale of 9 bars given by the approximation to the .5 digits of such
an average (the products are rated according to a 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, etc. scale).
This is not sufficiently detailed to represent a correct signal, as it compresses a
lot of different product ratings to the same value, making them indistinguish-
10We restrict the domain to a subset of generic UGC contents - images, videos, text, and
audio - enough to identify the treatable open source information available for customers.
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able. For example, in the consumer electronics market, a consequence of this
smooth difference is that top ten brands have an average rating of 4.2 and a
standard deviation of 0.02 (statistical research on a sample of 1000 products
extracted from Amazon dataset http://jmcauley.ucsd.edu/data/amazon/.)
Second factor, the consumer has to face another issue, namely, an asym-
metry of information when compared to the platform. In fact, platforms do
not show exactly the average rating (due to the aforementioned rounding),
and products with similar average ranking are sorted according to a secondary
ordering, which is defined by the platform and is completely unknown to the
users. Since popular categories have thousands of product, and hundreds with
the same average rating, the chosen ordering by the platform necessarily sets
the visibility of each product11.
Third factor is the uncertainty of the information provided by the reviews
(in particular, by the rating), as a reviewer can (un)intentionally provide fake
reviews. Specifically, reviewers with material interest in consumers’ purchase
decisions may post reviews that are designed to push consumers far away from
the actual best quality product. For example, during ADV campaigns, it is
common practice to acquire reviews from a marketing content providers (like
Bazaar Voice12). This kind of reviews is called shill reviews, i.e., “reviews
that distort popularity rankings given that the objective is to improve the
online reputation”, mentioning Mannino[40]13. It is not the hard case of review
artfully written by humans or machine learning process. Anyway their massive
uploading may have deleterious effects on consumer choices. Furthermore, the
potential presence of biased reviews may lead consumers to mistrust reviews,
as observe Mukherjee[38], Mayzlin[35] and others.
Fourth issue is that the rating system is incomplete: acceptable but unre-
markable products are not rated because the benefit to the reviewer could be
smaller than the cost of providing the rating (in the sense of writing consistent
and well motivated reviews). This often happens for new and unknown prod-
ucts. If the consumers themselves believe that reviews of less known products
are rare and difficult to find, they may not search for such reviews at all,
discouraging the production of new reviews, and decreasing the visibility and
the demand of the product. This issue entails some problems relied to the
inefficient policies of the online platforms, that tend to privilege big brand,
overlooking niche and new products fitted in the long tail.
Our fifth and last inefficiency factor is given by a bias in the information.
For example, comparing the amount of reviews with rating equal to 5 and
11Amazon adopts a Machine Learning process which exploits the own private infor-
mation of the reviewer profile, to decide which weight assign, without revealing the de-
tails. Following this private criterion, the sort of products ranking is not clear. See
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/nicolenguyen/amazon-fake-review-problem.
12www.bazaarvoice.com
13“Shill is a person who writes a review for a product without disclosing the relationship
between the seller and review writer. A shill can be the seller or someone compensated by the
seller for writing a review. Thus, shills can be agents of sellers, distributors, manufacturers
and authors who benefit from the sales of a product”.
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really short and uninformative textual content (such as “good”, “very good”,
“wonderful”...) with some equivalently small but negative reviews (rating 1
or 2), the first ones dominate significantly the second ones. This is because
usually, in a low rating review, the reviewer employs more effort to explain the
negative evaluation of the product, when compared to situations in which the
reviewer is positive about it. We show some examples of this behavior in Sec-
tion 4.3: Descriptive statistics. As it is clear, a rating which is not supported
by enough information, is not trustable, and this happen more often with pos-
itive than with negative ratings, and hence originates the aformentioned bias.
3.2 Reputation
As we have drafted in the related literature, a way to discriminate incorrect
reviews is based on the reputation of the agents submitting such informa-
tion. Several surveys on reputation systems can be found in the literature
(Vavilis[46]), in which the main requirements supporting a good or bad rep-
utation are identified. Some examples are focused to discriminate incorrect
ratings, in isolate and aggregate way. Other ones draw the needs of sufficient
amount of information, in particular about product features: “Features identify
the types of trust information that should be considered when assessing repu-
tation as well as the properties of reputation values and aggregation method”.
The survey shows some limits: the features are seen as theoretical notion,
which does not take into account important feasible signals, such as votes, re-
views length and other ones. Another constraint is the attention devoted only
to peer-to-peer platforms (like E-bay in its old style model, Airbnb, Uber and
others), in which both agents needs mutual information during the transaction.
Conversely for retailing platforms, the customer is not bounded to activate a
communication with sellers, uploading some messages . The possibility to
write a reviews is only a voluntary option. In another work, Tadelis[6] points
the attention not only on the trustability, but on the quality uncertainty of the
message, able to affect the trustworthiness caused by hidden information or
hidden actions. In the paper the author sets the conditions under which repu-
tation mechanisms can overcome the problems of asymmetric information. He
describes a “trust game”, where the key idea is that today’s actions will lead to
future consequences that affect the prospects of the seller. A best strategy to
run a reputation system is to provide future buyers with information about the
outcomes of a seller’s past behavior. The potential presence of biased reviews
may lead consumers to mistrust reviews (see Mukherjee[38], [35]). For this
reason distilling the reviewer reputation is necessary for a reliable opinion.
Lastly, Michael Luca [32] identifies tout court the online consumer reviews,
as an adequate substitute of more traditional instances of reputation, finding
that consumers react more strongly when a rating contains more additional
information, and this information is more visible.
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3.3 Votes
Different and heterogeneous approaches to design reputation systems are ev-
ident, according to different paths: theoretical studies (Tadelis[6]), add-on
tools integrated in the platform (Li, Tadelis and Zhou[34], Rietsche at al.[42])
or laboratory experiments (Lafky[30]). Our proposal exploits the information
capturing directly the vote (Thumb Up/Down response on how helpful an on-
line review is) as principal resource. The votes represent an import feature in
our model at two levels: the first one is at review level, and is used as rating
weight evaluation, the second one at reviewer level, as a proxy of the consensus
that he received by a consumer. We discuss how the votes enter in the quality
function in detail in Section 5: A quality product index based on UGC).
Different authors sustain the importance of votes such as feedback mech-
anism. The more interesting contributions come from computer science: see
Kim et al.[27], Liu et al.[31], Zhang and Varadarajan [49], Sipos, Ghosh et
al.[21]). Following these authors, the rating is submitted to a feedback, exploit-
ing the percentage of positive votes concerning the usefulness of this signal. In
economics branches, like Management and Marketing, Korfiatis [28] has been
one of the first authors to take into account when the rating is confirmed/deny
by the Thumb Up/Down reply. For Mudambi and Schuff[37], “Review help-
fulness is defined as the extent to which the customer perceives that a review
helps making the right decision in the purchasing process”. Other authors who
points out its importance are Cao et al.[6]: “Voting and filter options are two
systems that are used nowadays to identify helpful reviews”.
3.4 Textual content
As we have drafted before, an important component of UGC is the review
text, in which the reviewer exposes his impression about product details and
conditions of use. One of the simplest attributes of this message put into exam
by literature is the length of the textual content, which we will also use in our
analysis. Scholars have proved that the length of the review message has a
positive impact on review helpfulness (e.g. Liu and Park, 2015; Mudambi and
Schuff, 2010; Pan and Zhang, 2011). Long reviews may contain more infor-
mation (Pan and Zhang, 2011) and more convincing arguments (De Ascaniis
and Morasso, 2011) than short reviews. Extensive and well-argued reviews are
expected to provide enough information for a consumer to evaluate the quality
of the reviewed product (De Ascaniis and Morasso, 2011). Moreover, longer
reviews are not only perceived as more helpful in assessing product quality,
they are also perceived as more trustworthy than short reviews (Filieri, 2016).
Effectively, the length of a review is a measure which is able to show how
involved the reviewer is in writing it. From this point of view, consumers may
evaluate a reviewer who has spent more time writing a long review to be more




In the first part of the section we explain the source of data, the volume
and its structure. In the second one the methodology to extract and treat
the features ingested as arguments of our quality index. We complete the
discussion showing some descriptive statistics about the distribution of the
main features in the dataset.
4.1 Dataset
Our dataset consists of information collected on Amazon.com web store within
the period 2010-2014, about product price, product characteristics and reviews
information of the consumer electronics category14. Our data have been ex-
tracted from a larger dataset, delivered by Julian McAuley, a professor of
Computer Science at UCSD University, who has scraped a very large volume
of public data from Amazon.com retailing website15. The original file about
the consumer electronics category contains 1,689,188 reviews related to 10,043
products. We have filtered such dataset in order to capture most popular
products and to ensure persistence of such products, i.e. excluding the coming
and the going of certain goods. We have taken into account only long pres-
ence products, with a life-cycle on the platform longer than 4 years (within the
same range 2010-2014), both to ensure a certain homogeneity among compa-
rable goods and because, in shorter periods, the votes are not frequent. This
set contains 295 products and 51,264 reviews. Furthermore, we have excluded
small reviews, composed by less than 10 words, because in such a case the
helpfulness of user contents are less reliable. We have sorted this list in de-
scending order by review length, in order to keep more dense information,
cutting a threshold to reach an easily splittable number (100 products), to
better separate price segments. The ultimate sample contains 100 products
and a total of 29380 reviews.
14This category encompasses a massive volume of electronics that includes televisions,
cameras, digital cameras, PDAs, calculators, VCRs, DVDs, clocks, audio devices, head-
phones, tablets, smartphones and many other home products
15The DataSet "Amazon product data" (http://jmcauley.ucsd.edu/data/amazon/),
available for academic use, contains product reviews and metadata scraped from Amazon US
(www.amazon.com). The repository includes several information about products: reviews
(ratings, text, helpfulness votes), product metadata (descriptions, category information,
price, brand, and image features). All the data are available in json format, splitted into
several hundreds of files (It is not a database, but a repository of information needed to be
mutually linked). The full dataset contains over 180 million reviews related to a pool of
almost 6 million products including 142.8 million reviews spanning from May 1996 to July
2014. We selected only a subset of the complete information. We observe that the data
collection was scraped the 15th of July 2014, all the information are been backdated from
this point (that is the daily votes and other information, are picked up through a snapshot
in that day, offering a posterior representation of the dynamic process of UGC).
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4.2 Feature Extraction
In this section, we show the features list adopted in our framework of product
quality evaluation (see Section 5.1: Conceptual Framework). The literature
about UGC gets the best features such as significant predictors for the rela-
tionship between votes, rating and text properties.
We observe that there is a very small intersection between the UGC lit-
erature, that is the field with which we may compare our features extraction
and our analysis of the helpfulness evaluation of the rating and the votes,
and the economics studies about the more classical quality-price relationship.
The works about UGC are often devoted to perform a self standing quality
information analysis, which is strongly detached not only from products, but
from all the concepts of efficiency of the market, asymmetry of the informa-
tion, and other issues usually of interest from an economics perspective. Our
contribution attempts to make the bridge between these two lines of research.
Scholars have investigated the combination effects of numerical and textual
characteristics captured from reviews, to reach consumer matching taste, in
different contexts. In recent years, sentiment analysis, that is capturing the
polarity of the text speech (positive, negative, neutral) has attracted increasing
attention from scientific communities and business circles. This attempt of
using a text analysis is complementary to the more classical rating evaluation,
and tries to improve the accuracy of the current frameworks[9]. To show
some examples of useful features to provide qualitative information about the
text, we cite the readability index, which is used to reveal how much time
the consumer spends for reading a review. In the same direction, a sentiment
instance can show the low/high appreciation of goods, the reviews length alerts
about the writer effort, and so forth. Another feature whose relevance the
literature agrees on is the reviewer reputation (estimated in different ways,
such as by using the received votes in all the activities, or across the social
interactions with different players). Hong and Hong[25] offer an exhaustive
meta classification of the most used features in the literature. The 25 features
we used in our framework are a subset of the overall types, collected in two
macro-sets: the first ones referred to the reviews and the other ones to the
reviewer.
• Review related factors:
(i) Review depth (Total number of words of a review; review length
(sum of chars); review elaborateness)
(ii) Review readability (the distribution of Part of Speech: Adjectives,
Verbs, Names and others, in the text. Other types of metrics)
(iii) Review age (and product age): number of months in which is visible
on platform
(iv) Rating
(v) Sentiment Analysis of text. The feature could be seen such as a
duplication of rating but it does not work in the same way. The
rating is a synthetic impression of the reviewer in a quantitative
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form, whereas the sentiment is a ML processing of positive and
negative polarities of sentences of text. Often the normalized sen-
timent value is very different from the normalized rating stars.
• Reviewer related factors:
(i) Reviewer popularity (based on amount of votes received in the over-
all reviews)
(ii) Reviewer reputation (based on average of the percentages of positive
votes received)
For the complete features list, see Appendix B: Features. We observe that,
among the different groups of features, the ones related to textual properties
have less relevance (see the evaluation in Section 5.1: Conceptual Framework
). This result is compliant to the literature (see the survey Hong and Hong[25]
and Rietsche et al.[42] ). Anyway a full and detailed comparison about UGC it
is not easy, because the samples of the collected reviews are different, and the
dimension of the reviews sample is often too small (less than 5000). Conversely,
the reviewer reputation results are comparable, because, also by the other
authors, are used quantitative signals for evaluation (like votes, rank positions
and others), see Hong and Hong [25].
4.3 Descriptive statistics
In this section we present descriptive statistics analysis of the main features.
As we can see in Table 1 at page 26, in the upper-side we shown the data
of 295 products and 51,264 reviews. Furthermore, we have filtered and re-
moved small and uninformative reviews, in order to collect 100 products (and
29380 reviews), as we show in the lower-side. Note that, in the upper-side
of the table, the information are visualized only by rating, however the two
sides maintain the same distribution of reviews and reviewer information. All
the next statistics are referred to the sample of 29380 reviews aggregated by
product. In Table 2 at page 27 the information are splitted in a partition of
product segments by price. The results in the tables confirm a direct corre-
lation between rating and the first type of reviewer reputation (quantity of
positive votes)16, but not about the second coefficient (percentage of positive
votes) which remains almost invariant in all the lines. That explains the ca-
pability of high rated products to attract prolific reviewers (practically all the
luxury items), but not necessarily trustable. In the second table, the rating
and the price proceed with the same shape.
Another important correlation, in this case moving in the opposite direction.
concerns rating and reviews length17, highlighted in Table 1. This supports
our intuition over quality submersed. Although big brand products confirm
a stickiness between high rating and high percentage of positive votes, the
16A Pearson coefficient ρ = 0.88, in the first table and ρ = 0.94 in the second one.
17A Pearson coefficient ρ = −0.68 in the first table.
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same trend is observable also in the one or two rated reviews, well written
and long. The explanation of this result is confirmed by the reviewer at-
tention about product issues and troubleshooting (often affecting the one rate
review), because consumers appreciate useful information about defeats. Since
the quantity of one rated reviews is less than one tenth of five rated, because
they attract only the writer very specialized about failure, have a distribution
more fitted around positive votes. For example, a lot of five rating reviews
are short and limited to few words (as ’Num Words’ column confirms), and
several writers just imitate the behaviour of their colleagues, limiting to spend
a quick effort. Whereas the number of words of one rated reviews are more
and more informative (the distribution of review length has a peak in the 2-3
rating medium zone, absolutely not in high rating values). Briefly, as we will
show in the Section 6.2: Contribution of votes) there are some product low
rated candidate to provide more quality, comparing to that one set only by
rating, because affected by signal more informative and trustable.
In the second table 1 we shows the same information, trough the products per-
spective. We have chosen one hundred products (composed by 29380 reviews)
in the electronic market, in particular around the camera market category.
In our sample, to avoid an imbalanced distribution fitted completely to the
accessories market, we have chosen a spectrum partitioned for price values.
low price products (e.g.: cheap accessories, cables), medium-low price (e.g.:
compact cameras low-range), medium-high price (e.g.: compact cameras mid-
range, camera lens, expensive accessories), high price (luxury segment e.g:
compact cameras high-range, Mirrorless, DSLR, particular camera lens). The
splitting criterion was that of dividing our dataset in four groups of the same
dimension.
1. low price (e.g.: cheap accessories, cables) : p < 30$
2. medium-low price (e.g.: compact cameras low-range): 30$ ≤ p < 120$
3. medium-high price (e.g.: compact cameras mid-range, camera lens, ex-
pensive accessories): 120$ ≤ p < 250$
4. high price (luxury segment e.g: compact cameras high-range, Mirrorless,
DSLR, particular camera lens): p ≥ 250$
Following the partition by price, we note a similar average rating in each
segment. The percentage of positive votes confirms the global result of table
1, except for high price. Statistically, the reviews more voted are also they
well voted. Furthermore, in the luxury segment, the average rating is highest.
Since also the percentage of positive vote are high, all the signals involved
confirms high quality. We observe that the density of price distribution green
bars of Figure1 is accumulated around low price segment, that reflects the
general distribution of Platform electronics market (Coad [10]), in which the
number of accessories is 5 times the amount of reference products. In red bars
of Figure2 we show the log-price chart of a septile bars price range within (10$-
1600$). We observe that the white spaces around the range values (50$-100$)






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2: Main product feature plus price partitioned in segment by price.
Group type #items price ($) reviewer reviewer v%+ rating
reputation* reputation**
Low Price 25 16 (7.4) 2.5 (2.4) 0.23 (0.1) 0.43 (0.30) 4.2 (0.7)
Medium-Low Price 25 54 (21) 3.1 (2.0) 0.21 (0.1) 0.40 (0.22) 4.4 (0.5)
Medium-High Price 25 164 (35) 4.3 (3.0) 0.19 (0.2) 0.38 (0.41) 4.6 (0.3)
High Price 25 598 (220) 4.0 (2.7) 0.19 (0.15) 0.60 (0.30) 4.7 (0.1)
All 100 208 (231) 3.47 (0.7) 0.2 (0.15) 0.45 (0.1) 4.47 (0.2)
Note: For each column Mean (St. Dev.) (*) Average of total positive votes achieved by the reviewer for each
review (in product segment. (**) Average Amount of percentage positive votes achieved by the reviewer for
each review (in product segment)
Figure 1: Price Distribution ($)
Figure 2: Log Price Distribution ($)
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5 A quality product index based on UGC
5.1 Conceptual Framework
After the extraction of the main features (see Section 4.2: Feature Extraction),
the scope of our analysis is to select the most salient ones in order to adjust
the rating trustability and to define a product quality index for improving the
best quality products information achievable by consumers. To avoid falling
into risk of confusion between reviews quality, practically concerning informa-
tion quality, and product quality, we focus the attention about the exact role
of the signals. Different authors (Zhang et al. [49], Kim et al.[27], Chua[9])
have confirmed the usefulness based on the inherent properties of the review
itself, as a reliable signal: positive in the case of good product or negative in
the case of bad one. As discussed before, and visualized in table 6, the rating
system is generally accepted by literature as a good quality product index.
However, our work puts in relevance the lack in some circumstances (eg.: low
price, brand unknown and others), as we have widely illustrated in Section 3.1:
Inefficiency of rating. The scope of a new quality product index is trying to
trap this inefficiency through some other signals, useful to adjust and stabilize
the rating.
The first idea is adopting the vote as the rating weight, because it is a quanti-
tative signal approved by literature as a feedback mechanism of user consensus
on the reviewer job (Section 3.3: Votes)18. Unfortunately, this value alone is
not enough stable to treat uniformly the long/short presence fluctuations of
the review on the platform. For example, if a review has taken only two out
of two positive votes because the product related is a new arrival, the %v+
will be = 1, whereas if another review has 85 positive votes out of 100, the
%v+ = 0.85. The less positive percentage is not really a bad effect, because
the long-run permanence confirms durable positive feed-back with respect to
the other case. To compensate the difference, we are looking for a more robust
signal in conjunction with votes, able to dampen these fluctuations. A good
candidate is the reviewer reputation rr for different reasons: from a statistical
point of view it points out to more relevant reviews, it is also a global propri-
ety of the reviewer and it reinforces the high/low relevance of votes %v+. A
fortiori, extracting and exploiting only the reviews written by top reviewers
(who are ranked in top positions in dedicated platforms pages) seems a good
approach. Going back to the previous example, we can learn to vote %v+ as a
trustworthiness signal and reputation rr as a magnitude signal. If we multiply
rr ∗ %v+19, for high reputation rr > 2.5 this signal amplifies the outcome,
reducing the importance of vote in the two cases %v+ = 0.85 and %v+ = 1.
When the reputation is low rr < 1, the vote acquires more relevance and the
18Another candidate could have been the Brand awareness, but its effect is an argument
investigated in different fields, like laboratory experiments and "Signal Detection" theory,
not compliant with our research.
19Within all the actual collected reviews, %v+ ∈ [0.5,1] and rr ∈ [0.5,3.5].
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difference between the two cases are reduced. In the light of this, our intention
is simply to calculate a quality index by linear, or log linear, combination of
the arguments: rating, votes and reviewer reputation. Our first goal is de-
constructing the information, in order to investigate more formally about the
relationship among all the involved variables.
Let us present the basic steps of our process. First of all, we have extracted
and collected the most promising features from the UGC resource data, now
we must decide which one to choose, evaluating if the reviewer reputation con-
firms expectations. To get this achievement, we estimate the votes through all
the features (see par. Accuracy evaluation), in order to extract their contri-
bution for the evaluation. This is an intermediate stage for proceeding toward
the feature selection mechanism (see Features ranking), verifying the relevance
of reviewer reputation. Finally, we need checking for the mutual independence
of all the signals through the Pearson correlation (see par. Features indepen-
dence)20, otherwise some components can affect each other, generating a final
value distortion. Following this direction, we go to propose a novel formula,
as we can see in the equation(3), able to sustain our intuition, on the basis of
a statistical learning proof. Briefly, a review provided by high votes and high
reviewer reputation is proposed as a good value of reliable information. When
the vast majority of the product reviews shows this behavior, and the rating
is high, the quality index confirms this outcome, whereas the rating is low,
the quality index downgrades the rating. In the case of discordant signals, the
result is hybrid and difficult to decode for literature. The power of our quality
index is instead the capability to synthesize the quality into a unique measure,
both in presence of concordant or discordant signals, to facilitate the compar-
ison between products in all the conditions. We are going to show in detail
the main statistical processes to test the consistency of our quality index.
Estimation of the votes
In order to proceed toward feature selection analysis, for finding the weight of
the more important features able to affect the vote, it needs to estimate the
dependent variable throw a feature regression. The prediction accuracy will
permit to decide the more efficient model, from which selecting the meaningful
features. In this paragraph we draft the framework of the models’ pipeline that
we adopt for regression. In the next one we discuss the accuracy of the results.
Definition: vi is defined as the vector vi = (vi1, . . . , viT ), where viτ is the
ratio of positive votes for product i at time τ , i.e., the ratio of positive votes
that all the reviews which have been written at time τ (i.e., during month τ)
about product i have received:
20We observe that, although reviewer reputation is the more weighted argument to predict
the vote, the correlation between vote and reviewer reputation is low. The reason is that the
regression to estimate the prediction is a complex not linear function, whereas the correlation
is a linear test.
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viτ =
#positive votes for product i at time τ
#total votes for product i at time τ
, (1)
We do not use the total positive votes, because they are distributed in very
sparse way with high variance, as we show in Figure3, making us difficult not
only the ML estimation, but the complete evaluation of quality index.
The classification setting needs to split the reviews set in a Cross Validation
sample: some products will became the Training set, other ones the Test set.
Each product i is formed by a set of reviews j, each one composed by a set of
properties (features) whose complete list is presented in Appendix B:Features.
Given a training set ofM samples and a Test set of N ones, in each sample are
known the feature review vector x1 . . . xn. Assuming the vote vij = v(x1 . . . xn),
we try to get the best model (regression function) f(x1 . . . xn)Train in order to
predict the vote v̂ = f(x1 . . . xn)Test of Test product reviews. Note that the
features x1 . . . xn = gnlp(z1 . . . zh) are a result of nlp(·) function, applied to the
original textual features z1 . . . zh in order to transform them to quantitative
items. We provide a meta-model that launch 7 functions over 25 features and
K hyper-parameters (compliant to each model). The regression models used
are: Lasso, Ridge, SVR (Support Vector Machine) linear, SVR with kernel rbf
(Radial Basis Function), Elastic Net, Decision Tree and Random Forest21.
Figure 3: absolute vote+ distribution of 3 products during time
Accuracy evaluation
In this task we evaluate the accuracy of the statistical learning model provided
by the best prediction. For each models we use a data matrix of 50933 reviews
per 25 features (40746 for Training 10187 for Testing)22. The best fitting model
21All the code used for this paper is available from ("https://github.com/
maroccasting/economics-experiments").
22The amount of reviews is higher of the effective number used for the index evaluation,
but the two quantities do not have the same meaning. In the case of feature evaluation,
there are not a privileged aggregation: each unit of information, the review, is treated as
independent. In the case of product informativeness evaluation, the reviews are aggregated
by product, and the estimation of attributes are referred to each product.
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is evaluated with respect to the coefficient of prediction R square23 R2 and the
Mean Square Error MSE using a Cross Validation partition set (70-30). We
find the best fit model in Random Forest function.
————————————– [RandomForest] ————————————–
Total Score: 95.1%
Parameters: ’RandomForest max_depth’: 15, ’RandomForest n_estimators’:
25024
’MSE’: ’0.01’, ’R2’: ’0.92’, ’dim Training Set’: (40746, 25), ’dim Test Set’:
(10187, 25)
—————————————————————————————————–
It is not easy a detailed comparison with literature, because each experiments
use too different samples and different features. In addiction, our scope is not
exactly the vote prediction, but the analysis of mutual independence of the
features, and the capability to sort them by ranking. We obtained a result of
R2 = 0.92, in general very good, taking in account the difficulty of the test
(the features are very heterogeneous, and often the votes are accumulated due
to mimic effects of emulation. Someone votes a well written review, and she
is followed by other people invited by the lighting of this signal. Actually we
observes that, when a review gains some votes, the probability to became sur-
rounded by reviews with votes are higher. The Random Forest algorithm[4]
provides a feature ranking evaluation, embedded to the model. Through this
process it is possible to extract the best features weighted by a Gini Index
coefficient25. In the last years it is increased the attention of the economists
about Random Forest model, to learn typical structures of data text used in
economics literature. At this purpose, see some papers of Stefan Wager, Su-
san Athey et al. [2; 47]. For detailed results of the accuracy of each model,
and parameters used, see Appendix C: Accuracy evaluation for each regression
model.
23The coefficient of determination R2 of the prediction. The coefficient R2 is defined as
(1 - u/v), where u is the residual sum of squares ((y_true− y_pred)2).sum() and v is the
total sum of squares ((y_true− y_true.mean())2).sum(). The best possible score is 1.0.
24The hyper-parameters n_estimators means the number of trees, where max_depth
means the max number of levels among these trees.
25The Gini Index, or Gini impurity, calculates the amount of probability of a specific
feature that is classified incorrectly when selected randomly. Optimizing the splitting that
better separates the information at the next tree level, it can evaluate the best way of walking
through sub-trees of the forest. Let’s the intuition: the Gini index varies between values
0 and 1, where 0 expresses the purity of classification (becoming to the same class), and 1
indicates the random distribution across various classes. The value of 0.5 shows an equal
distribution of elements over some classes. The direction will be predictor that permits an
higher gain during the descend. The same process can be used to ranking the best features,
these providing the optimal separability of the paths. The regression task is equivalent to




Scope of the feature selection (ranking) process is ordering and reducing the
set of features, in order to keep only the more relevant, maintaining enough
accuracy level. Through this process we can decide a cut point, in which to
take the signal more useful for assuring a good quality index. Practically we
want to confirm the relevance of reviewer reputation.
Intuitively, if the original estimation through the full set of features is close
to the new estimation through the limited best ones, then can pick up these.
More formally: choosing a subset y1 . . . yp of original features x1 . . . xn so that
ṽ = g̃(y1 . . . yp) and v̂ = f̂(x1 . . . xn), if |MSE(f̂(·))−MSE(g̃(·))| < ε, where
ε is the maximum error value admitted, we can adopt the reduced model as a
good alternative26.
The five more ranked features (weight estimated with Gini Index) of Random
Forest models, and best setting parameters, are:
Table 3: Features ranking
Feature Gini Index
(MEAN % POS. VOTES per review) per REVIEWER(*) 0.64
NUM REVIEWS OF REVIEWER 0.063
(MEAN TOTAL POS. VOTES per reviews) per REVIEWER(**) 0.037
REVIEW LENGTH 0.022
WORDS QUANTITY (***) 0.017
(*) Average of total positive votes achieved by the reviewer for each review
(**) Average Amount of percentage positive votes achieved by the reviewer for each review
(***) The review length is calculated as number of chars of the full text, whereas the
quantity of words is based on words
In the Random Forest regression, as best feature we discover the reviewer
reputation rr. The normalized Gini weight of reviewer reputation is equal to
0.64, that exceeds roughly ten times the second one27. This result is com-
pliant to the literature, as we have shown in Section 3.2: Reputation) Also,
the second and third features concerning reviewer reputation, whereas the last
26Random Forest (RF) is a statistical learning model, used both for regression and classi-
fication task. Intuitively, RF is a sort of generalization of Decision Tree concept. Supposing
to walk a tree, in which, for each node, we have to take a decision about which branch to
choose. If the decision depends by a condition embedded the node, an algorithm can go
across the tree, according to this decision matching. The RF consists in a large number of
decision trees like this which operate all together. During the training learning, the algo-
rithm set the conditions withing the nodes of the trees, and the ways to cross them. The
model holds a feature selection function, because it knows the decision order in which each
feature leads the walking.
27As we have shown in a previous note, for RF the feature selection is endogenous to the
model. This result is not always true for all models. In general, the feature selection is more
difficult and needs a process focused in. A universal approach is the permutation of feature
relevance, measuring this value by observing how random re-shuffling (thus preserving the
distribution of the variable) of each predictor influences model performance.
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twos are referred to the length of the reviews (a sort of density of information:
whose meaning is the voter prefers to be well informed). As we will shown in
next sections, the reviews length is an impact factor about
————————————— [RandomForest] ———————————–
Total Score: 82.81%
Parameters: ’RandomForest max_depth’: 15, ’RandomForest n_estimators’:
250
’MSE’: ’0.03’, ’R2’: ’0.82’, ’dim Training Set’: (40746, 5), ’dim Test Set’:
(10187, 5)
—————————————————————————————————–
Since the accuracy of prediction model is very high, we can infer that the
vote strongly depends on writer reputation. The index R2 = 0.82 means that,
also limiting the training taking only the first 5 best features, we can obtain
enough good prediction. Another emerging result is that the sentiment anal-
ysis features have low impact to the vote, in other words, the voter is not
affected positive or negative information.
Since the reviewer reputation is the more meaningfully decision-maker to split
high votes from low ones, we can adopt it as a corrector to amplify the power
of votes to adjust the rating, and determinate best product quality. We export
this intuition in the quality function equation(3).
Features independence
As we have observed before, we must demonstrate the absence of strong mu-
tual correlation between the features and the rating r involved in the quality
index product formula. Not only the main features, but also about all the
features x1 . . . xn for avoiding dangerous interlacing during the random Forest
learning. At this purpose, we calculate the Person correlation between features
xi, xj. We show only the result about the feature used to weigh the rating,
and about the correlation between votes and rating. We show the results only
of the main ranked features of table 3 at page 32.
Table 4: Features correlation
Feature pearson corr.
RATING, (MEAN % POS VOTES per review) per REVIEWER(**) 0.12
RATING, NUM REVIEWS OF REVIEWER 0.21
RATING, (MEAN POS VOTES per reviews) per REVIEWER(*) 0.17
RATING, VOTE 0.06
VOTE, (MEAN % POS VOTES per review) per REVIEWER(**) 0.21
VOTE, NUM REVIEWS OF REVIEWER 0.20
VOTE, (MEAN POS VOTES per reviews) per REVIEWER(*) 0.20
(*) Average of total positive votes achieved by the reviewer for each review
(**) Average Amount of percentage positive votes achieved by the reviewer for each review
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5.2 Quality index formula
Here, we offer a formal definition of quality. This quality concept will be use in
Section 6: Discussion) to analyze its performances. We consider a set of goods
N = {1, . . . , n}. Each good i ∈ N is associated to a price-quality pair (pi, qi).
In our model price and quality are the two pivotal variables leading the choice
of a consumer. We do not define the quality of a product as something given
and known by the consumer, but as something which she can discover while
observing other variables. These variables are observable while investigating
the UGC about the product on the marketplace. In particular, we define the
quality of product i as
qi(ri, rri,vi) = ri
T∑
k=2




(i) k = 1, . . . , T denotes the discrete unit of time of signal product in the
marketplace, where each unit represents one month length period. T
is the maximal time horizon that, in our experimental setting, is given
by the maximal number of months we consider for a product in the
marketplace.
(ii) Vi(rri,vi, k) =
∑k
τ=1 log(rriτ + 1) · viτ is a weighted sum, where:
(iia) vi is defined as the vector vi = (vi1, . . . , viT ), where viτ is the ratio
of positive votes for product i at time τ , i.e., the ratio of positive
votes that all the reviews which have been written at time τ (i.e.,
during month τ) about product i have received (see Section 5.1:
Conceptual Framework). Sometimes in tables we denote this signal
as v%+ for distinguishing from positive absolute votes, v+, when
they are present together.
(iib) rri is defined as the vector rri = (rri1, . . . , rriT ), where rriτ is
the component at time τ of the reviewers reputation for product
i. We show how these components are calculated. The reviewer
reputation is defined through all the reviews she has written on the
platform. Given a product i and j a reviewer who has written a
review about it on the platform, we define the punctual reputation
of reviewer j about her review of product i28, Rij, as the number
of absolute positive votes RRij received by the reviewer about this
review, times the percentage of positive vote PPij received by the
reviewer about this review, that is Rij = RRij ∗ PPij. Given J
the set of products about which reviewer j has written a review, we
28We suppose, as this is always the case, the each reviewer never writes more than one
review about the same product.
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Then, rriτ is defined as the average of the reputations of all the
reviewers who have written a review for product i at time τ .
(iii) ri is the average rating that the reviewers have assigned to product i
during all the periods of time.
Function Vi represents the cumulative ratio of positive percentage votes
the reviews about a given product have received, weighted by the reputation
of the involved reviewers, meaning that if most of the reviews are written by
“prestigious” reviewers, they receive more weight. On our real data, such a
function Vi is convex shaped and lies under the bisector line. The quality is
then given as the area under this curve, and it has a higher value if most of
the reviews have received mostly positive votes and are written by prestigious
reviewers, multiplied by the average rating ri. Observe that in such a formula,
the rating still plays an important role, but it does not represent alone a
quantification of the quality of a product.
Note We may observe that the variables rri and vi are a quantification of the
quality of the UGC about a given product and, as such, they are involved in
the formula as monthly values (as they do not represent an absolute value over
time, but thet can vary depending on the received reviews). While the rating
ri represents a quantification of a value about the product itself, and as such
it may be considered constant in time and it is then used with its aggregated
value over the full time period.
6 Discussion
The experimental evidences presented in this section shows that the quality
index rating based do not satisfy requirements, able to distill and exploit
trustable and useful information spread on platforms. In particular, most
rating systems lack support for scope similarity of same quality product with
respect to the price, delivering a relationship (price, quality) unable to inform
the consumer about correct price clarification. Since, on retailing platforms,
most products ordered list and recommended systems suggestions are founded
on sorting by rating, this tendency is harmful for the consumer. Because it does
nothing but increase the asymmetry between him and the platform, concerning
the distribution products informativeness. In particular, the product rating
is often flat and opaque, set by platform without exactly being compliant to
the average rating of product reviews. In the case of good quality reviews,
but not enough to big brand challenging. the rating system contributes to
hide the niche and new products, decreasing the products differentiation. Our




The first three tables: table 5,table 6 and table 7 show some attributes of
twenty products sorted by rating, belonging respectively to three price seg-
ments: low, high and all prices. The segments are a replica of Section 4.3:
Descriptive statistics, but in this case we have preferred focused the attention
only on low (accessories) and high price (luxury) sectors, because far from each
other, and more interesting for the retailing market. These two classes are also
compared with overall products. The tables show immediately a small part but
representative about the display of products information on platforms: static
lists, landing pages, result lists as the results of search engines, recommending
system and other cases.
Two points are in evidence: the platform actual rating (represented in first
column) is very flat. One implication of this finding is a full arbitrary way to
list the results of same rating in the whatever second order, disorienting the
consumer when there are thousands of values of 4.5 stars, such happens in elec-
tronic consumer market. Furthermore, the variance between the normalized
average rating and the normalized quality, favours the last one (0.14 vs 0.06
in low price market products, 0.72 vs 0.07 in high prices). Briefly, in the same
samples of 20 items, we find more variety of the prices of products, indexed
by quality comparing to these ones indexed by rating. Despite the flatting
variance of platform ratings, the average value calculated by algebraic mean
and the average of platform rating actually visualized, are pretty similar. The
average of qualities is what change. Not only, comparing the ratio between
high price and low price rating (3.97/4.52 = 0.8), with the ratio between high
price and low price quality (0.72/0.82 = 0.87), we infer that the quality differ-
ence between luxury products and accessories is closer than that shown by the
rating differences. The same result can be observed also in table 8, because
the average quality of all price products is inferior with respect to the two
subsets: low price and high price ones. Furthermore, the best rating products
often do not maintain the best quality. Since the platform suggestion, and the
consumer attitude, is searching products by rating, the consequences are to
choke (putting in secondary pages) high quality products.
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Table 5: Low price
products
rpl µr µqnorm price ($)
4.5 4.50 0.38 11
4.5 4.50 1.00 21
4.5 4.44 0.85 15
4.5 4.39 0.75 11
4.0 4.38 0.95 19
4.0 4.13 0.75 15
4.0 4.10 0.73 25
4.0 4.08 0.90 10
4.0 4.05 0.70 10
4.0 4.00 0.67 18
4.0 4.00 0.85 13
4.0 3.99 0.72 9
4.0 3.98 0.49 27
4.0 3.86 0.72 25
4.0 3.80 0.60 28
3.5 3.58 0.57 10
3.5 3.51 0.60 28
3.5 3.43 0.81 5
3.5 3.40 0.67 10
3.5 3.40 0.71 7
3.90(0.04) 3.97(0.3) 0.72(0.14) 15.8(7.3)
Table 6: High price
products
rpl µr µqnorm price ($)
5.0 4.94 0.85 1600
5.0 4.90 0.80 305
5.0 4.90 0.85 454
5.0 4.85 1.00 370
5.0 4.79 0.96 540
5.0 4.70 0.74 540
5.0 4.68 0.74 850
4.5 4.64 0.85 440
4.5 4.63 0.83 899
4.5 4.52 0.74 299
4.5 4.45 0.88 314
4.5 4.43 0.82 598
4.5 4.40 0.87 750
4.5 4.40 0.75 454
4.0 4.40 0.87 750
4.0 4.24 0.82 330
4.0 4.09 0.78 450
4.0 4.04 0.69 450
4.0 4.04 0.84 270
4.0 4.00 0.83 620
4.50(0.05) 4.52(0.4) 0.82(0.07) 564(298)
Table 7: All price products
rpl µr µqnorm price ($)
5.0 4.90 0.94 454
4.5 4.57 1.00 40
4.5 4.39 0.73 11
4.0 4.22 0.78 25
4.0 4.13 0.74 15
4.0 4.05 0.68 10
4.0 3.99 0.70 9
4.0 3.89 0.80 150
4.0 3.86 0.70 26
4.0 3.80 0.60 28
4.0 3.77 0.70 249
4.0 3.75 0.61 200
3.5 3.66 0.62 175
3.5 3.64 0.59 599
3.5 3.54 0.72 220
3.5 3.53 0.68 200
3.5 3.49 0.60 67
3.5 3.45 0.70 174
3.5 3.44 0.54 170
3.5 3.40 0.55 200
3.85(0.1) 3.65(0.8) 0.65(0.15) 151(150)
Notes: Lines ordered by rating (DEC) Columns 1.st
platform rating, 2.mean rating, 3.rd normal quality,
4.þprice. In the bottom line: mean(sd)
A summary is presented in table 8, in which we show some statistical prop-
erties (Mean, Standard Deviation) referred to the price distribution within dif-
ferent market segments. Each ones is shown following three types of order (by
platform trunk/rounded rating, by average rating and by our quality index).
We visualize only the average results of first ten products, which represents
the canonical first page consulted by consumers.
This table shows the more meaningful implications of our research. The prod-
ucts price differentiation of all the segments, setting a sort order by our quality
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index, is larger then the differentiation achieved by rating order. Actually,
for lowest prices (market accessories) the standard deviation of prices is 20%
higher (5.73 > 4.90). Since this is a relevant segment, in which the number of
accessories is five or more times the amount of products, to which are linked,
increasing the alternative for the consumer, can change the amount of demand.
Just think that "Amazonbasic", the private label brand of Amazon, is com-
posed by accessories for the vast majority of the catalogue29. In this segment,
the brands are less relevant (eg.: a lot of small and unknown competitors sell
headphones or covers for the same mobile phone), then the consumer plans to
trust the rating as reference quality index. As consequence of this behavior,
the consumer loses two times: she can dispose of less average quality (in table
8 last column, we compare order by quality products, in bold, with order by
rating, in italics) and she must renounce to more variety of prices, as shown
before.
Table 8: Price Variation of products ordered by different modes
price segments pr mean (sd) r platf mean(sd) r mean(sd) qn mean(sd)
order by platf. rating (DEC): first 10 items
Low 14.50 (4.85) 4.20 (0.02) 4.25 (0.19) 0.78 (0.16)
High 622 (377) 4.90 (0.03) 4.74 (0.13) 0.83 (0.08)
All 75 (135) 4.23 (0.03) 4.18 (0.33) 0.65 (0.20)
order by average rating (DEC): first 10 items
Low 15.50 (4.90 ) 4.20 (0.02) 4.25 (0.19) 0.77 (0.16)
High 630 (378) 4.95 (0.03) 4.75 (0.13) 0.83 (0.08)
All 76 (131 ) 4.26 (0.02) 4.18 (0.33) 0.67 (0.21)
order by quality index (DEC): first 10 items
Low 14.30 (5.73) 3.98 (0.03) 4.14 (0.29) 0.83 (0.09)
High 639 (378) 4.75 (0.02) 4.60 (0.27) 0.88 (0.53)
All 119 (140) 4.20 (0.03) 4.12 (0.38) 0.78 (0.10)
Notes: Columns 2-3rd price statistics, 4.th platform rating, 5.th mean rating, 6.th normalized quality.
29The amount of mobile phones visualized on Amazon.com is around five thousands items,
whereas that of headphones is roughly twenty thousands, and the clips and accessories of
headphones, that is a subcategory of a subcategory, is one hundred thousand. Even if the
average price of these leaf categories is few dollars, multiplied for the large magnitude of
this segment, it overpasses the reference product business that drags it.
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6.2 Contribution of votes
Table 9: Comparing vote, rating, quality over time among 10 products
years (cod. prod) µ v%+ µ v̂%+ rev voted (total) µ r qnorm num words
Low rating products
2 (B0044YU60M) 0.66 0.64 121(1279) 3.6 0.56 125
3 (B0054ERGTU) 0.60 0.63 115(1011) 3.3 0.58 110
4 (B004UJ76KD) 0.68 0.65 170(1538) 3.4 0.55 145
5 (B004GT50YR) 0.65 0.69 301(2110) 3.7 0.60 177
6 (B0062FR9JK) 0.64 0.68 205(2099) 3.5 0.59 110
mean 0.65 0.66 180(1620) 3.5 0.58 136
High rating products
2 (B0041Q38NU) 0.65 0.68 57(3211) 4.5 0.60 105
3 (B004G6002M) 0.55 0.51 125(2898) 4.6 0.61 85
4 (B004GF8TIK) 0.61 0.59 210(3285) 4.4 0.67 77
5 (B0043T7FXE) 0.54 0.55 276(3182) 4.7 0.65 60
6 (B0059F9TRQ) 0.55 0.56 311(3300) 4.9 0.64 81
mean 0.57 0.58 191(3231) 4.5 0.64 85
Notes: Compared main attributes of five products low rating (random selected > 1000 reviews) with five
products high rating. In the first column the years of life, in the 2nd the % of positive vote, in the 3rd the %
of positive vote estimated by our framework, in the 4th the number of product reviews voted and the total, in
the 5th the average rating, in the 6th the quality normalized. We have renounced to show products of only 1
year platform presence because affected by too few votes. We do not show products less than 3 stars, because
few interesting for the consumer.
The table 9 examines the influence of review length (number of words) and
percentage of positive votes, as impact factors with respect to the quality in-
dex. More precisely, a bigger quantity of words captures more positive votes,
so that to compensate a lower rating. In fact the two products highlighted in
bold, whose codes are B004GT50YR and B0041Q38NU, have the same nor-
malized quality index, despite having 1.3 rating difference. We have preferred
to choose two groups of random products (both high voted, but one half high
rated and the other one half low rated) because a collection of more products,
reduced to the average information, are candidate to show flat values. Not use-
ful, to put in relevance the influence of the votes toward the rating, in order to
evaluate the quality. In the table, the average difference between high and low
rating products is 1.4 (normalizing the rating is roughly 0.3), whereas the dif-
ference by quality is 0.8. Which sets our quality estimator as a good candidate
for product differentiation, at the contrary of pressed information shown by
platform. Which supports our idea of unbalanced rating with respect to the
quality. Concerning the vote estimated (hatted), they are close to real values.
In some cases, the products’ reviews do not have enough votes, especially for
new products. In fact the absolute quantity of votes grows up year by year,
but in the first months, the lack of votes infers the risk to evaluate an unstable
quality. Since we have demonstrate that the vote estimation is not affect by
dynamic features whose behavior changes over time, the vote estimation can
be used as a proxy. In this way, it is possible to assure a quality index stable
and able to assure a good coverage, as we show in the table.
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7 Conclusion
The contribution of our research concerns an investigation about inefficiency
of rating system to evaluate the product quality. Using Machine Learning
frameworks we demonstrate both the (un)trustability of rating, such a sig-
nal to easily find a large spectrum of differentiated products, searchable by
consumers. In alternative, we propose a novel product quality index based
on not-price signals, that combine the rating with other information, publicly
available on the platform. In particular the user votes, the reviewer reputation
and the review characteristics, able to adjust the rating through a feedback
mechanism. Furthermore, our quality index supports a reduction of search
costs, and an increase for consumers’ chances to search for and compare het-
erogeneous products. Evidence of experiments, carried out on one hundred
products of the consumer electronics market and roughly sixty thousands re-
views, confirm the superiority of our quality index to clarify price and quality
relationship in new web platforms, exploiting new and traditional features
adopted in historical studies. We confirm that, in the range of prices where
the information is dense and more uniformly distributed among products, like
medium and high price segments in cameras electronic market, the rating of
known brands is a good proxy as a quality index, as predicted in most of
the literature. However, the different features distribution for accessories, in
which the rating is not the clear measure of quality in the vast majority of
cases, require the adoption of a more stable quality index.
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A Data Collection Details
The format of the files extracted by the data Collection.
• reviewerID - ID of the reviewer, e.g. A2SUAM1J3GNN3B
• asin - ID of the product, e.g. B01BPFN3S4
• reviewerName - name of the reviewer
• helpful - helpfulness rating of the review, e.g. 2/3
• reviewText - text of the review
• overall - rating of the product
• summary - summary of the review
• unixReviewTime - time of the review (unix time)
• reviewTime - time of the review (raw)
The original data contain two of the features, used to calculate the quality
of product: the helpful, that is the positive consumer votes and all the votes,
and the overall, that is the rating. About the other feature, the price is ob-
tained through a semi-automatic process, because the price change over time,
and we needs the average price. Starting from the asin code30, it is necessary
to build the address URL of page product on the platform (e.g.: https://ww
w.amazon.com/gp/product/B01BPFN3S4) then extracting the pricefrom the
page. Since the data go back to some years ago, it needs a tool. A simple way
is to adopt the site Camelcamelcamel.com, which has the most complete price
history of millions of goods sold on Amazon, starting from 2008, and provides a
record of Amazon price history over whatever time period. Since the charts of
price time series provided by CamelCamelCamel are in jpeg graphics format, it
needs another tool to extract quantitative values from the screenshots of price
history charts. We have used an algorithm provided by Web-PlotDigitizer (ht
tp://arohatgi.info/WebPlotDigitizer/app). In this way we have obtained the
time series of prices in digital format, then estimated the average price during
time.
30ASIN stands for Amazon Standard Identification Number. It is a 10-character alphanu-




The full list of features of each review.
1. DATE - Date of publication
2. RATING - Star rating
3. RATIO USEFUL / ALL - Density of useful words31
4. RATIO USEFUL / ALL (First half of the review)
5. DENS POS:NVJ - Lexical feature: (density of main POS Part of Speech:
adjective, verb... , ie.: POS: JVN / ALL POS)
6. DENS POS:NVJ (First half of the review)
7. NUM REVIEWS per PROD - Num reviews of the same product
8. NUM REVIEWS per REVIEWER - Reviewer reputation 1: Num re-
views written by the reviewer
9. (MEAN POSITIVE VOTES per reviews) OF REVIEWER - Reviewer
reputation 2: average positive votes achieved by the reviewer for each
review (it’s independent by the number of reviews)
10. (MEAN H VOTES per reviews) OF REVIEWER Reviewer reputation
3: Average Amount of Helpful votes achieved by the reviewer for each
review
11. CURRENT LIFETIME PROD (# months) Current lifetime cycle of
product (until the date of the review)
12. FULL LIFETIME PROD (# months) Lifetime cycle of product (until
the scraping date)
13. LENGTH REVIEW - Length (in chars) of review text
14. QUANTITY WORDS - Amount of words of review text
15. SENTIMENT 1 - Algebraic sum of sentences positive and negative
16. SENTIMENT 2 - Quantity of positive sentences
17. SENTIMENT 3 - Quantity of negative sentences
18. SENTIMENT 4 - Maximum positive contiguous sentences
19. SENTIMENT 5 - Maximum negative contiguous sentences
31For useful words we intends topics useful for the consumer in his choices. The vocabulary
of this information has been obtained with a proprietary tool
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20. SENTIMENT 6 - Algebraic sum of sentences positive and negative (First
half of the review)
21. SENTIMENT 7 - Quantity of positive sentences (First half of the review)
22. SENTIMENT 8 - Quantity of negative sentences (First half of the re-
view)
23. SENTIMENT 9 - Maximum positive contiguous sentences (First half of
the review)
24. SENTIMENT 10 - Maximum negative contiguous sentences (First half
of the review)
25. ARI Index - Review readability. This metric is used in linguistic analysis
of reviews/news (Readability indicates the extent to which an individual
understands and comprehends the product information, which leads to
customers accepting information To test the level of understandability
of a review, this research examined Automated Readability Index (ARI)
C Accuracy evaluation for each regression model
————————————– [RandomForest] ————————————–
Total Score: 95.1%
train_score = 0.98 test_score = 0.95
best_params: ’RandomForest max_depth’: 15, ’RandomForest n_estimators’:
25032
’MSE’: ’0.01’, ’R2’: ’0.92’, ’dim Training Set’: (40746, 25), ’dim Test Set’:
(10187, 25)
—————————– [SVR (rbf)] ————————————
Total Score: 78.83%
best_params= ’rbf C’: 100.0, ’rbf cache size’: 1000, ’rbf gamma’: 0.05, ’rbf
max iter’: 2000




best_params: ’SVR_linear C’: 0.01, ’SVR_linear cache size’: 1000, ’SVR_linear
max iter’: 5000
’MSE’: ’0.056’, ’R2’: ’0.662’, ’dim Training Set’: (40746, 25), ’dim Test Set’:
(10187, 25)
32n_estimators means the number of trees, where max_depth means the max number of




best_params: ’Ridge alpha’: 0.0001, ’Ridge max iter’: 100000.0, ’Ridge nor-
malize’: True




best_params: ’Lasso alpha’: 1e-08, ’Lasso max iter’: 100000.0, ’Lasso nor-
malize’: True




best_params: ’ElasticNet alpha’: 2e-05, ’ElasticNet fit intercept’: True, ’Elas-
ticNet l1 ratio’: 0.7, ’ElasticNet max iter’: 100000.0, ’ElasticNet normalize’:
True
’MSE’: ’0.046’, ’R2’: ’0.727’, ’dim Training Set’: (40746, 25), ’dim Test Set’:
(10187, 25)
Some variants of Random Forest setting.
————————- [ RandomForest SelectFromModel —-
(SGDRegressor(penalty="elasticnet"), threshold=’median*0.8’) + Original Ran-
domForest ] ] —————————————
Total Score: 84.75%
best_params: ’ max depth’: 10, ’ n estimators’: 250
’MSE’: ’0.02’, ’R2’: ’0.88’, ’dim Training Set’: (40746, 25), ’dim Test Set’:
(10187, 25)
————————— [RandomForest SelectKBest —–
(score_func=chi2 8 features) + Original RandomForest ] ————-
Total Score: 70.78%
best_params: max depth’: 10, n estimators’: 500




Optimizing Product Quality in Online Search
Abstract
Exploiting an original definition of product quality, based on the information
we can get from the User Generated Content, and driven by a statistical learn-
ing algorithm, we propose a new ordering mechanism for product search on
platforms. This product quality formula is imported in a decision making
mechanism which adopts an optimal Stopping Rule, in order to set the op-
timal time to terminate the search process and choose a good to purchase. We
show how the consumer can benefit from the implementation of such a mecha-
nism, demonstrating an improvement in terms of consumer utility at different
levels of price, with respect to other sorting traditionally adopted by platforms.
We propose a utility function fitted to a Gumbel distribution, and we demon-
strate a stochastic dominance of our model. Experimental evidences on the
camera market category put in relevance the efficiency of our quality index for
ranking the effective quality compared to the more traditional rating system.
This is particularly true for the low-price accessory market segment of prod-
ucts, in which we show higher utility dominance and slightly higher elasticity
of demand.
1 Introduction
In the first chapter we have proposed a product quality index based on the so-
called User Generated Contents (UGC)33, whose insights have been captured
by means of Machine Learning tools [5]. The aim of this index is to exploit it to
define a mechanism to drive consumers’ choices for finding trustworthy signals
of actual quality. We have shown how our quality index can improve prod-
uct price differentiation, applying our model to a sample of electronic camera
products. The achieved results are leveraged in this second work, whose main
goal is to take advantage of the quality index defined before. Following this
perspective, consumer utility is maximized with respect to the search costs. In
order to confirm our intuition, we define a theoretical model and we validate
on the same sample defined in Chapter 1. This validation leads us to discover
that a decision making system, based on our quality index, can improve con-
sumer welfare in products searching. Our proposal is also useful in identifying
the sources of search cost heterogeneity and in improving price differentiation
of the retrieved products. Our model adheres to a sequential search model,
33For UGC we intend any content—text, specially reviews, created and shared by people,
publicly available on social media, website, and other marketing channels.
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proposing a new implementation, based on a quality index evaluated in an
exogenous framework. In this approach, we suggest how to distill the latent
information already available on the platforms (ordering best features in sta-
tistical learning regression algorithms) to define a quality signal34. Such a
signal permits us to formalize a decision-making mechanism, called Stopping
Rule (SR), capable of improving the consumer search. Our model provides
two main contributions: (i) Firstly, we suggest a new product quality measure
that is not only based on easily observable parameters, such as the rating,
but also on other indirect signals extracted from the User Generated Contents
(UGC) (ii) Secondly, we make this measure of quality the center of a search
mechanism, in order to optimizing consumer choice. Such a mechanism can
be implemented as complementary to the classical rankings proposed by the
platforms, such as ordering by rating or by price. As a result, we show a better
quality ranking. In order to validate our model, we have tested it on data col-
lected by the platform Amazon.com, applying it to one hundred medium and
long permanence products on the marketplace (whose information is driven by
thirty thousands reviews) belonging to the category Electronic cameras and
accessories.
In the last two decades, the increased interest of scholars in product informa-
tion searching has followed the growing quantity of products exposed on plat-
forms. Baye, De los Santos et al.[1] describe the evolution of product search
in an analytical survey, from the pre-internet era until nowadays, that shows
the importance of search optimization for the stability of competitive markets.
Following the first stage (1995-2005) of price-comparison sites, in which the
transactions were separated from the search, the platforms established a dom-
inant position over the online retailing. A reason up their incoming supremacy
is the integration of both searching and purchasing actions as parts of the same
deed. The concomitant introduction of the Search Engine tools, spread by the
so-called Google revolution, changed de facto optimization capabilities of the
matching between seller-side proposed goods and consumers demand. Unlike
village markets, in which the search capabilities were restricted to provide a
physical location for product exposure, in the online scenario the visibility is
the result of virtual mechanisms. These tools are responsible for searching
and ranking, handled by algorithms, as Martens quotes[33]. However, the still
imperfect matching between the consumer’s needs and the available products
is the natural consequence of some frictions. These frictions are related to an
asymmetry between the platform, that releases a large amount of information
that is incomplete and unclear, and the consumer, who suffers from a restricted
and costly time for searching. As a result, the vast majority of the products
unexplored and trapped within the long tail (Brynjolfsson[8]).
Contrary the popular opinion, the bulk of the information is not always
beneficial, as it can mislead the consumer. To overcome this, we simply as-
sume that the search for information is costly, and in order to maximize her
34This part is only drafted because treated deeply in the Chapter 1. (See Section 5.
quality product index UGC based)
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utility, the consumer has to face an important trade-off between the neces-
sity of obtaining good quality information and the need to not waste time.
In such an ecosystem, better options for the consumer may be overlooked, if
the search time did not give the possibility of discovering the corresponding
alternatives. The marketing strategy of most online retailing platforms suffers
from some lock-in effects, in which various best-selling products keep on first
being more salient as firstly highlighted to consumers for a long range of time.
Best-sellers increase more and more in visibility, sales and profits. On the
contrary, the so-called niche products stay stuck in the long tail, reinforcing
the well-known law of "the rich get richer and the poor get poorer". This in-
formation asymmetry is responsible for a lot of products remained unexplored
because trapped and low ranked[8]. In some conditions, these issues are gen-
erated by the inefficiency of rating system, when this signal is used as the
default measure of all product quality. Some doubts about their capability to
cover all scenarios, arise particularly for products not belonging to mainstream
brands, such as we have shown in the first chapter (see 3.1 Inefficiency of rat-
ing). Conversely, the new quality index proposed here, coupled with a decision
mechanism based on the SR, would support consumer search in all these cases.
These results are validated by a Maximum Likelihood Estimation of the utility
function35 within a large spectrum of reservation prices, starting from acces-
sories and ending luxury products (see Section 6: Estimation). We show that
the SR mechanism guarantees the higher utility (stochastically dominant) for
the consumer, with respect to the alternative case without SR, under different
specifications. In particular, the best benefits of our index are achieved in
two segments, accessories (less than 30 $) and medium-high price (100-240$),
for different reasons. In the case of the cheapest products, where the brands
are often unknown, the reviewers are more interested in writing long realistic
and detailed reports. They put more effort into describing product defeats
than credits. The medium price level captures the more trustable and verbose
reviews too, adding the advantages of known brands. Although the bran-
dization of luxury level group is proficient, in this segment, the probability of
finding trustable/trustworthy signals (products that are actually rated highly,
sustained by useful information and positive votes) decreases, as does the ef-
fective information quality. A lot of reviews are limited to few and unuseful
words: "good", "excellent", “wonderful” and so forth.
Concerning the price elasticity of demand36, the more informative contri-
bution of SR mechanism arises for products whose prices are lower than 100$.
In particular, in the accessories market, where the average price is the low-
est, our simulation reveals that the “SR” outperforms the alternative without
“SR”, showing slightly higher elasticity (-3.5 < εNOSRd < εSRd < -1). Better
35As utility function we use an Extreme Value distribution of Type-I (GEV-I), that is
popular in the newest search models.
36The own-price elasticity index εd used here measures the impact of price on search.
According to the literature on Searching, we simulate the demand evaluating the difference
percentage of products retrieved, in response to a one percent change in price. Supposing
also that the product found is also bought.
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quality products, captured through our mechanism, explains this result. Con-
versely, when the range of prices is confined to the luxury segment of the
specific category, the demand becomes relatively inelastic (-1 < εd < 0), in
both cases (with and without SR). Consumers who are willing to remain loyal
to brands/products still do so even if the price increases.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next Section reviews the
background literature, concerning the Searching about the sequential search
model used here, and the SR mechanisms. In Section 3 we present how our
detailed data about the reviews are handled through statistical learning al-
gorithms. In Section 4 we define the product quality index, as will be used
in Section 5, where we outline the model and the identification strategy. In
Section 6 we estimate the model on a data sample of electronic camera cate-
gory, showing a stochastic dominance of the utility function, between optimal
searching with SR mechanism and without. In Section 7 we present the dis-
cussion and the conclusion. We terminate proposing possible future direction
of our work.
2 Related literature
The recent interest of scholars in search-based demand on platforms has fol-
lowed the explosion of the online retailing business, and the opportunity for the
consumer to view a large amount of products. One of the more investigated
problems is how to minimize the effort spent to collect useful signals from the
distribution of product information. Though the click-action in online envi-
ronment can provide a fast and high-performance effect, the spasmodic accu-
mulation of information assumes a trend so high as to counteract the reduction
of search time. This imbalance reveals an inefficiency of search tools provided
by the platforms, which do not optimize the consumer effort for finding known
and unknown products. As pointed out by some researchers, such as Koulayev
[32], De los Santos [15] and others, the consumer, looking for unknown prod-
ucts, may estimate the trade-off between expected results that match with his
taste and the time spent to achieve them. Their strategy consists in verifying
the consumer utility about the products retrieved, trying a few attempts, in
order to refine the outcome. Following this perspective, a stable paradigm on
which the literature has relied for the last decade, is an extension of the se-
quential search model, which was first proposed by McCall[36]. In this section
we will take in account various works that have adopted this model in differ-
ent situations. Although the economics literature about price search is very
broad, the vast majority is focused on questions involving general or partial
equilibrium37, quite different from our research, which is basically devoted to
the price-quality relationship. For these reasons, we restricted the comparison
37Many models are only theoretical, and take into account simple signals of quality prod-
uct, far from the data fields. Other works do not enter into details about the search mecha-
nism, but bring out the consumer and firm behaviour for evaluating price dispersion, price
obfuscation and similar problems. For a survey see Ellison[18] [27].
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to a few essentially close papers. Among them, the studies of Kim, Albu-
querque and Bronnenberg[31], De los Santos[15] and Koulayev[32] which have
taken into account only the demand side consequences, without modeling ad-
justments towards the supply side. In chronological order, the first one applies
the paradigm of sequential search. Initially, it separates restricted prior search-
ing knowledge, in this case general information acquired ex-ante, in order to
proceed toward more detailed evidences (the product pages) discovered step by
step. The product searching continues until the marginal benefits overcomes
the marginal costs. When they reverse, the search terminates maximizing the
expected utility for the consumer. The goal of the paper is to minimize the
search cost, for consumers who are well-informed about the product for which
they are looking. For this purpose, two ranking list of products are selected:
one based on platform sales and another one on recommending list. The model
is validated through a dataset of electronics consumer products on Amazon
platform (camcorders), similar to the one we used.
The second model, proposed by De los Santos, Hortacsu and Wildebeest [15],
uses other kinds of data (books), which allows observation of the online stores
visited while consumers shop for an item, and focusing on the store from
which the consumer decided to buy. They attack the question in a higher
level, quickly to find the store with the best price, comparing "fixed sample
size search", which was first provided by Stigler[39], in a seminal paper about
economics of information, with the "sequential search" model that we have
mentioned before. While, in the case of sequential search, there always ex-
ists the possibility of stopping the trial earlier due to sufficiently meaningful
results; however, the alternative model requires anticipating a number of alter-
native n to discover the optimum price among k environments. The authors
tackle the research question, focused on price differentiation problem, while
considering only the price information and limiting the search to known prod-
ucts. The fixed-search does not estimate a prior sorting in order to facilitate
searching, and this conveys the risk of failing at optimizing the search cost
when the distribution of price is unfavourable38. However, this class of models
has contributed the initiation of a rich body of works on retailing research.
Nevertheless, in the last decade, the monstrous growth of online information,
such as detailed in the introduction, forces this model to set a limited sam-
ple ex-ante of well-known products. Currently, the online platforms nowadays
submit new product alternatives, offering a complete suite of internal sorting
product lists and trapping the consumer inside this world.
The last model, more similar to our research, is proposed by Koulayev[32] by
means of a sequential search model. The author simulates the search cost
in a popular aggregator of US hotels, capturing all the clicks and pages the
consumer visits, until the final transaction is achieved. Different attempts are
38Mentioning Baye et al.[3]: "In Fixed sample search, consumers commit to a fixed num-
ber, n, of stores to search and then buy at the lowest price at the conclusion of that search.
A clear drawback to such a strategy is that it fails to incorporate new information obtained
during search, such as an exceptionally low price from an early search".
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measured with respect to several setting combinations, obtained by changing
the attributes of goods for best performance (eg.: the type of sorting, order by
price, by rating, by hotel distances, by filters like panorama view or beach ac-
cess, and so forth). The consumer’s beliefs about these attributes is taken into
account by measuring empirical distribution of hotel prices and quality (esti-
mated by not-price attributes), with respect to the distribution of consumer
choices driven by the search. In order to optimize the expected consumer util-
ity, the author considers a two-steps function. In the first period, the consumer
utilities beliefs are theoretically formulated before new evidence. In a second
one, the new information acquired is mapped through to posterior probabil-
ities, using Bayesian inference. Since the posterior can subsequently become
a prior again, this inferential chain leads to a result when the system decides
the best step stopping. This step is estimated through an advanced regres-
sion design based on information extracted from the platform pages and the
iterative sequence involving the consumer characteristics vector39. Koulayev’s
model takes into account both product clicking and purchasing, and essen-
tially tries to satisfy the consumer taste with the presence of unknown goods,
optimizing his utility. The author adopts a SR mechanism, based on quality-
price relationship. Our work is based on SR application as well, but rewards
the consumer in a quite different way. Whilst Koulayev employs embedded
signals to estimate consumer utilities, our solution treats the utility exploiting
the exogenous signal of quality, explained in further detail later. Though less
effective in presence of a large amount of products and heterogeneous informa-
tion distribution, our model is faster than the model used by Koulayev, in the
case of small segments of products, and more homogeneous price distribution.
In recent years, Morris and Strack [25] have discussed the theoretical common
ingredients included in Bayesian sequential models induced by a stopping rule
. In light of their work, they have concluded that: "A decision maker sequen-
tially observes signals at a cost and dynamically decides when to stop acquiring
information."[25]. The authors’ work is paradigmatic and demonstrates the
equivalence among different models. These models have in common a cost
function used to make a decision through a dynamic evidence accumulation
process. The agent decides when to stop the search, because it is no longer
worth continuing. In our case as well, the SR mechanism decides to stop when
the expected information that would be obtained by continuing is not ben-
eficial. However the step-wise decision is not based on an embedded signal
(like the reservation utility of Koulaev’s and De los Santos’s models), rather
on a unique external signal, the previously evaluated quality. The quality for-
mulation has distilled and learned the more useful UGC information, through
a statistical learning algorithm, in order to attain the consumer benefit with
39The prior-posterior models are studied in Bayesian probability theory. The prior distri-
bution P(Θ) represents the belief about the true value of parameters Θ (eg.: in the case of
Koulayev[32] consumer characteristics). Whereas the posterior distribution P(data|Θ) is the
distribution representing our belief about the parameter values after taking the observed
data into account (in the example, the data of pages that actually match the consumer
characteristics).
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respect to the good reached. During the iterative step, when we attempt to
find the best quality signal, the consequent utility is a candidate for maxi-
mization. From a theoretical point of view, it is not easy to show that the
embedded information attained by all the features, in all the paths crossed in
the regression methods used in the First Chapter, behaves as a good estima-
tor. The intuition, however, from one side is integrated into a SR theoretical
model (Section 5.2), and satisfies the simulation on field data (Section 6).
Concerning the literature related to SR, information search and opinion for-
mation are central aspects of decision making in the choices explained through
our model. Here we are facing what is referred to in the literature as an optimal
stopping rule problem. Optimal stopping rule problems entail an exploration-
exploitation trade-off [34]: a trade-off between exploiting a safe known option,
but possibly sub-optimal, and exploring a new unknown one, which may be
much better, but may also be much worse, with a consequent loss of time. The
most famous optimal stopping problem studied in economics is the Secretary
problem [19]. It describes a situation in which a firm needs to find the best
applicant for a secretarial job. The firm can see each of the applicants sequen-
tially. After seeing an applicant, the firm can rank her quality, and must decide
to hire or reject her, without being able to return to a rejected applicant, or
predict the quality of future applicants. This differs from other models in that
the quality of the applicants is ordinal and not cardinal, meaning that only the
ranking matters, instead of the effective value. The optimal solution of this
classical problem is extremely elegant and simple, as it consists in interviewing
and rejecting the first 1/e(∼ 37%) of the applicants, considering the “value”
of the best of these rejected applicants as a threshold, then continuing inter-
viewing and hiring the first applicant who is above this threshold. After that,
many other extensions or modifications of the original problem have been in-
vestigated, taking into account explicit search costs [40], unknown population
size [37], possibility of recall [22], and many other features.
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3 Data and Product Features
3.1 Data Collection and Description
The data used in our analysis refer to the so called “search goods” category40.
We use the same dataset of consumer electronics camera information we have
presented in Chapter 1 (Section 4). This choice is explained by the fact this
is one of the fastest-growing e-commerce categories, and studying the prod-
uct information acquisition of durable search goods, like in this category, is
more feasible for estimating demand primitives (the consumer can explain its
choices, without deep experience and evaluation after purchasing the good).
Our dataset consists of information collected on Amazon.com web store within
the period 2010-2014, about product price, product characteristics and reviews
information. We have filtered the full dataset to reach products provided with
more information compliant to the analysis requirements. At the end of the
process, our dataset counts 100 products and 29380 reviews, from which we
have extracted 25 product features.
3.2 UGC information
In the first chapter, we have illustrated the insights of UGC, and why they are
useful to build a trustable product quality signal. Here, we do not repeat all
the properties and parameters setting in order to define which UGC are the
most appropriate to define our index. However, We present a brief summary
about the meaning of User Generated Content (UGC), and we refer the reader
to Chapter 1 (Section 3) for more details. For UGC we intend a generic
information (linguistic or quantitative) that is uploaded by some users on an
online platform. A UGC item is composed by rating, textual content and
votes. The rating is the judgment that a reviewer gives to a certain product,
in the form of stars number (generally from 1 to 5), the textual content is
the description and the opinions of the reviewer about the characteristics of
the product. The consumer votes represent the Thumb Up/Down mechanism
adopted by the consumer to approve or reject a review. A reviewer provided
by many positive votes enjoys a high reputation.
40The literature differentiate between two product types a) search goods and b) experience
goods. Search goods can be generally described as products of which the characteristics can
quite easily be evaluated before purchasing them (Luan et al., 2016). Most products (and
in particular, the ones of our analysis) fall into the search good category, such as clothing,
home furnishings, electronic objects, etc. Experience goods can be generally described as
products of which the characteristics are quite difficult to evaluate prior to buying them
(Baek et al., 2013). It is very important to differentiate between the two types of products
because the product type influences the effect of some factors on the helpfulness. consumers
may, for example, rely on prior experience, on product inspections or in some other ways
for searching and collecting information, such as recommendation or word of mouth. In the
most recent scenario and as it is the case of our analysis, such a search of information may
be done online thanks to the so called UGC.
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3.3 Price segments
Our dataset has been splitted in four price segments, for different reasons.
First of all, both the reviewer and consumer attitudes change at the variation
of price, in term of attention, precision and requirements. This heterogeneity of
signals, basically changes the quality distribution, as we have already shown in
the Section 6 of Chapter 1. The price segments listed here concerns: low price
products, medium-low price, medium-high price, high price. The splitting
criterion was that of dividing our dataset in four groups of the same dimension.
1. low price (e.g.: cheap accessories, cables) : p < 30$
2. medium-low price (e.g.: compact cameras low-range): 30$ ≤ p < 120$
3. medium-high price (e.g.: compact cameras mid-range, camera lens, ex-
pensive accessories): 120$ ≤ p < 250$
4. high price (luxury segment e.g: compact cameras high-range, Mirrorless,
DSLR, particular camera lens): p ≥ 250$
4 Product Quality Index
Our work proposes a new quality index based on UGC. From one side, it
inherits the current perspective to adopt the rating as basic signal for quality.
From the other side, it adjusts it through a feedback mechanism. This feedback
is exploited through several key features, extracted from public available online
information. The extraction of the key features is presented in details in
Section 5 of Chapter 1. In the following, we present a short overview of how
this extraction has been implemented.
4.1 Statistical learning algorithms
The rating system is generally accepted by literature as a good quality product
index. However, our work puts in relevance the lack in some circumstances
(e.g.: low price, brand unknown and others), as we have widely illustrated
in the first chapter Section 3.1 Inefficiency of rating. The scope of a new
quality product index is trying to trap this inefficiency through some other
signals, useful to adjust and stabilize the rating. An approach could be adopt-
ing the vote as the rating weight, because it is a quantitative signal approved
by literature as a feedback mechanism of user consensus on the reviewer job.
Unfortunately, this value alone is not enough stable to treat uniformly the
long/short presence fluctuations of the review on the platform, and needs a
stabilizer mechanism able to dampen these fluctuations. A good candidate is
the reviewer reputation rr: from a statistical point of view it points out to
more relevant reviews, it is also a global propriety of the reviewer and it rein-
forces the high/low relevance of votes %v+. In the light of this, our intention
is simply to calculate a quality index by linear, or log linear, combination of
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the arguments: rating, votes and reviewer reputation. Our first goal is de-
constructing the information, in order to investigate more formally about the
relationship among all the involved variables.
In this chapter we draft only the basic steps of our process, referring to the
first chapter Section 5.1 Conceptual Framework, the detail of this operation
(all the paragraphs mentioned are referred to first chapter Section 5.1). First
of all, we have extracted and collected the most promising features from the
UGC resource data, now we must decide which one to choose, evaluating if the
reviewer reputation confirms expectations. To get this achievement, we esti-
mate the votes through all the features (see parag. Accuracy evaluation), in
order to extract their contribution for the evaluation. This is an intermediate
stage for proceeding toward the feature selection mechanism (see parag. Fea-
tures ranking), verifying the relevance of reviewer reputation. Finally, we need
checking for the mutual independence of all the signals through the Pearson
correlation (see parag. Features independence). All these signals concur to-
ward an implementation of quality. Following this process we propose a novel
formula, in the equation (3).
4.2 Quality formula
Here, we present the formal definition of quality we have already extensively
described in Section 5.2 of Chapter 1. We present again the formula in order
to facilitate the reading of the current section.
We consider a set of goods N = {1, . . . , n}. Each good i ∈ N is associated
to a price-quality pair (pi, qi). In our model price and quality are the two
pivotal variables leading the choice of a consumer.We do not define the quality
of a product as something given and known by the consumer, but as something
which she can discover while observing other variables. These variables are
observable while investigating the UGC about the product on the marketplace.
In particular, we define the quality of product i as
qi(ri, rri,vi) = ri
T∑
k=2




(i) k = 1, . . . , T denotes the discrete unit of time of signal product in the
marketplace, where each unit represents one month length period. T
is the maximal time horizon that, in our experimental setting, is given
by the maximal number of months we consider for a product in the
marketplace.
(ii) Vi(rri,vi, k) =
∑k
τ=1 log(rriτ + 1) · viτ is a weighted sum, where:
(iia) vi is defined as the vector vi = (vi1, . . . , viT ), where viτ is the ratio
of positive votes for product i at time τ , i.e., the ratio of positive
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votes that all the reviews which have been written at time τ (i.e.,
during month τ) about product i have received:
viτ =
#positive votes for product i at time τ
#total votes for product i at time τ
, (4)
(iib) rri is defined as the vector rri = (rri1, . . . , rriT ), where rriτ is
the component at time τ of the reviewers reputation for product
i. We show how these components are calculated. The reviewer
reputation is defined through all the reviews she has written on the
platform. Given a product i and j a reviewer who has written a
review about it on the platform, we define the punctual reputation
of reviewer j about her review of product i41, Rij, as the number
of absolute positive votes RRij received by the reviewer about this
review, times the percentage of positive vote PPij received by the
reviewer about this review, that is Rij = RRij ∗ PPij. Given J
the set of products about which reviewer j has written a review, we







Then, rriτ is defined as the average of the reputations of all the
reviewers who have written a review for product i at time τ .
(iii) ri is the average rating that the reviewers have assigned to product i
during all the periods of time.
4.3 Asymmetry in quality-rating relationship
Rifling through product reviews of amazon.com website, we have observed
that the information distribution is not symmetric. Especially, going across
the high-low rating axis, the richer product reviews are not always the ones
with the highest ratings. On the contrary, a lot of one-or-two-rated reviews
provide useful and eloquent information about the product. In this section,
we investigate this phenomenon, showing the relationships between price, rat-
ing and quality, within different conditions. This investigation occurs as a
preliminary analysis for comparing price regions in which quality and rating
are directly proportional to each other (and then, in which the rating could
work as a good approximation for quality), to other regions in which they have
opposite behaviors. In fact, as we will show by validating equations (5) on our
data, the probability to find high quality products is higher when both price
and rating are high. On the contrary, this is not true anymore in the case of
41We suppose, as this is always the case, the each reviewer never writes more than one
review about the same product.
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low prices. The first result is conventionally accepted in the retailing litera-
ture, for village markets and online platforms. But the second one is often not
taken for granted, and it has been largely overlooked by researchers.
Given the 100 products of the sample we described in Section 3.1, we split
it in two according to the rating: “Low Rating” and “High Rating” products,
as separated by the median value, which is equal to 4.2.
1. Low Rating (rating rl ≤ 4.2)
2. High Rating (rating rh > 4.2)
Another partition for our dataset is the one which separates our sample
between “low price” and “high price” products, as divided by the median value,
which is equal to 100$42.
1. Low Price (price pl ≤ 100$)
2. High Price (price ph > 100$)
Finally, a third partition is about quality: “Low quality” and “High quality”
products, as divided by the median value, which is equal to 0.7.
1. Low quality (ql < 0.7)
2. High quality (qh ≥ 0.7)
Statistical evidence of asymmetry. Given an attribute a ∈ A = {rl, rh, pl, ph, ql, qh}
(where rl is for low rating and rh for high rating, etc.), we consider the prob-
ability P(a) that a random product taken from the dataset belongs to the
given group. This probability is defined as the number of products in the
corresponding group divided by the total number of products:
P(a) = #products tagged by attribute ’a’
# all products
.
For example, if we refer to high quality products, then a = qh and we have
P(qh) =
# high quality products
# all products
.





# products tagged by both attributes ’a1’ and ’a2’
# products tagged only by ’a2’
.
42Observe that in this case we have chosen a different partition with respect to prices
compared to the one we have shown in Section 3.3, since a tetra-partition is not appropriate







# high quality AND high rating products
# high rating products
.
We illustrate our conjecture by presenting the following inequalities{
1) P(qh|pl ∩ rh) < P(qh|rh) < P(qh|ph ∩ rh)
2) P(qh|pl ∩ rl) > P(qh|rl) > P(qh|ph ∩ rl)
(5)
that we want to validate on our dataset. Obviously this is not enough
to verify the consistency of our quality index and as a full support of our
conjecture. However, this analysis is useful to draw the intuition and to provide
a qualitative preliminary analysis of how our features behave.
Applying the Bayesian rule, the conditional probability of the first expres-
sion P(qh|pl∩rh) can be written as P(qh ∩ pl ∩ rh)P(ph ∩ rh) . We have that P(qh∩pl∩rh) =




= 0.06 and P(ph∩rh) = #{i|p(i)≥100$ ∧ r(i)≥4.2}#{total i} =
13
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= 0.43, from which we get that P(qh|pl ∩ rh) = 0.060.43 = 0.13. In a similar
way, we calculate the values for the other probabilities, from which we obtain:
{
P(qh|pl ∩ rh) = 0.13 < P(qh|rh) = 0.22 < P(qh|ph ∩ rh) = 0.67
P(qh|pl ∩ rl) = 0.15 > P(qh|rl) = 0.12 > P(qh|ph ∩ rl) = 0.09
We observe that the difference between the extreme values of the first
inequality chain in (5) that is equal to P(qh|ph ∩ rh)− P(qh|pl ∩ rh) = 0.67−
0.13 = 0.54. This is bigger then the same in the second inequality chain, which
is equal to P(qh|pl ∩ rl)−P(qh|ph ∩ rl) = 0.15− 0.09 = 0.06. We can conclude
that the more relevant asymmetry happens between high prices with respect
to low ones, when considering high rating products. Instead, such asymmetry
is irrelevant when considering low rating products.
We summarize these results, observing how the probability of finding cheap
products, when both the rating and the quality are high, is pretty low. Since
the canonical quality index of platforms is the rating, when the user sorts the
products by price and after by rating, she will get a quality dispersion in the
winding of the long tail. Hence, in the case of accessories (i.e., in the case of low
price products), a product list ordered by rating does not inform the consumer
about the correct quality. On the contrary, over a certain price threshold, the
rating is more in line with the quality. A possible explanation may be found
in the consumer behavior. In fact, usually a consumer puts more attention in
reading a review, when she does not recognize the brand (and the accessories
are more often unbranded). On the contrary, in the case of high price products
and mainstream brand awareness, she accepts more easily the rating assigned
by the reviewer without further investigation.
Graphical representation of asymmetries. In Figure 4, we show the
asymmetries we observed in the previous inequality through a chart represen-
tation of the quality as a function of the rating, i.e., representing the q(r), in
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the two previously mentioned segments of price, i.e., low and high. The first
function, for the low price group, is given by a cubic spline approximation of
the fitted sample, and it is concave and decreasing. Conversely, the second
function is convex and increasing. The two slopes confirm the inequalities we
showed before.
((a)) low price level ((b)) high price level
Figure 4: Comparison of low-high price segments (x-axes: rating, y-axes: quality)
Similarly, in Figure 5 we represent q(log(p)), i.e., the quality as a function
of the logarithm of the price, for the low and the high rating groups. The
two curves have a very similar shape. Briefly, in term of interpolation fitting,
changing the rating level, the distribution of data affects less the quality.
((a)) low rating level ((b)) high rating level
Figure 5: Comparison low-high rating level (x-axes: log price, y-axes: quality)
5 Theoretical model
As we have already mentioned in the introduction, the imperfect matching
between the needs of the consumer and the available products on online mar-
kets is the consequence of some information asymmetries. Such asymmetries
were already existing previously to the Google revolution, but became surpris-
ingly more evident in the online ecosystem. In fact, from the one side, the
uncontrolled amount of UGC gives, in theory, the potential to the consumer
to collect a more detailed information. On the other side, the way in which the
platforms partially show and partially hide this information, and the limited
attention of the consumer for getting and organizing this giant flow of news,
make the online world more complicated and more inefficient than expected.
In order to reduce this asymmetry, the consumer needs to get as more good
information as possible out of these UGC, but by doing that, she faces a very
important trade-off, between the wish of discovering the best quality product,
62
and the search costs among different alternative (see Section 5: Theoretical
model), which are becoming higher and higher, due to the required effort for
doing that.
We represent this trade-off as an optimal stopping rule problem, in which a
consumer makes a decision about the optimal time for stopping searching new
alternatives, and start exploiting one of the known ones. She has to decide
when to be enough satisfied with a sub-optimal choice, given the cost of inves-
tigation, better than keep on looking for a better alternative. The potential
of this optimal stopping rule approach, compared to the more classical opti-
mization problems in economics, is twofold: (i) firstly, the decision of stopping
does not need to be taken a priori, but can evolve with the investigation of
the scenario by the consumer. This feature translates well the fact that, while
looking for a good alternative, the time of investigation often depends on and
adapts to the past history of the investigation itself: an investigation may be
extremely fast when, by lack, a very good option is soon discovered , while
it can be extremely long in the opposite case. (ii) Secondly, this a posteriori
decision does not need for the consumer to have a preliminary guess about the
distribution of the quality, or any Bayesian updating of some beliefs about it.
The result of this stopping rule problem is then embedded into a 2-threshold
model, for fixing the minimum level of quality a consumer should aim at get-
ting while pursuing a good. The other threshold is represented by a maximum
price the consumer is willing to pay and that represents a budget constraint.
This threshold is assumed to be given a priori and it is not further discussed
in our analysis.
5.1 The 2-threshold (price-quality) decision model
Given the set of goods N and the couple price-quality (pi, qi) for each i ∈ N ,
where pi is given and qi is observable through equation (3), the consumer checks
each good one after the other, according to a given ordering π = j1, . . . , jn,
with the meaning that if i = jt, then i is the t-th good which has been checked
by the consumer. We suppose that the consumer makes a choice about one
single unit of good to pursue43, according to the following 2-threshold model
in which she fixes:
1. a maximum price threshold p̄ she is ready to spend for pursuing the good;
2. a minimum quality threshold q̄t, denoting the quality a consumer requires
from a good, and that a priori may depend on the time t of investigation.
In our 2-threshold model, we suppose that the consumer pursues a good as soon
as both the conditions are met. We assume that the price constrain remains
the same, while the wished quality may adapt with time, depending on the
43Differently from some more classical models, in which the chosen quantity to pursue is
the main variable, in these models we assume that the choice is about which good to pursue,
and the quantity is always equal to 1.
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collected information. This assumption translates the fact that a consumer has
immediately all the information about the prices, without effort, and then she
is capable of fixing a threshold a priori, while establishing the quality requires
some cost of search and, consequently, also the level of satisfaction may adapt
with time. According to our 2-threshold model, given a product i ∈ N , and a
couple price-quality (pi, qi), a necessary condition for the consumer to pursue
good i at time t is that {
pi ≤ p̄
qi ≥ q̄t,
with i ∈ {j1, . . . , jt}, meaning that it is necessary for the consumer to have
already discovered good i at time t in order for her to decide to pursue it.
Such a condition is not sufficient, as the consumer could have already chosen
another good at an earlier time than t. The goal of establishing the optimal
satisfying threshold q̄t for the quality at time t can be represented as a search
problem, that we model and investigate in the following section.
5.2 The optimal stopping rule problem
In a classical search problem, a player has to face an important trade-off,
between the wish to look for a best alternative, and the limited amount. This
kind of problems are usually modeled as stopping rules problems. Classical
stopping rules problems are usually defined by:
1. a sequence of random variables X1, X2, . . . whose distribution is assumed
to be known, and
2. a sequence of real-valued reward functions u0, u1(x1), u2(x1, x2), . . ..
A player may observe the sequence X1, X2, . . . for as long as she wishes.
For each t = 1, 2, . . . after observing the signals X1 = x1, X2 = x2, . . . , Xt = xt,
she may stop and receive the known reward ut(x1, . . . , xt), or she may continue
and observe the signal Xt+1. In the literature, the solutions to such problems
are often well representative of the real life experience, in which being satisfied
with a sub-optimal choice may be better than wasting too much time for
investigation.
This kind of model matches well with our online ecosystem, in which the
enormous amount of information makes really difficult, for a consumer, to have
the time to fully explore all the alternatives while looking for the best one and
in which getting the necessary information to establish the quality of a good
is assumed to be costly.
In our model the player is a consumer, and the signal (the quality) about
a given choice i ∈ N (a product, a search good) may be observed by spend-
ing enough time checking all the information about a given product, namely,
checking the UCGs about it available on the platform. We consider the maxi-
mum number of steps for investigation, i.e., the time horizon, equal to n, i.e.,
equal to the total number of goods. In the worst case, in fact, the consumer
may decide to check all the goods before making her choice. We suppose tha
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investigating one of the alternatives has a fixed cost per time unit equal to c.
Then, for each t = 1, 2, . . . , n, we define the sequence of real-valued reward
functions for the consumer as
u0 = 0
ut(qj1 , . . . , qjt) = max{qj1 , . . . , qjt} − ct. (6)
This is the reward function of a classical stopping rule problem, well known
as the job research problem, with recall, when the exploration of an alternative
has a cost and when the horizon of time is finite. We can observe that, when
c = 0, i.e., when investigating for the quality of a good is not costly, the best
strategy for a consumer is to investigate all the available alternatives, before
making a choice. The function ut(qj1 , . . . , qjt), described in (6), represents the
utility function for a consumer when pursuing the best arg max{qj1 , . . . , qjt}
at time t of exploration.
With Theorem 1, we obtain the quality threshold to maximize this utility,
i.e., the optimal stopping rule for the problem defined in (6), when we suppose
that the quality is uniformly and independently distributed.
Theorem 1. Suppose, without loss of generality, that the ordering is given by
π = 1, . . . , n and that the corresponding quality is given by the realizations of
some random variables Qi which are uniformly and independently distributed
in {1, . . . , Q}. Then, the optimal stopping rule problem described in (6) is
given by a constant threshold equal to






Proof. Given the finite number of steps, the optimal stopping rule for the
consumer can be obtained by backward induction in the following way.
Step n-1: We suppose that the consumer has already checked the first
n − 1 alternatives. Let Mn−1 be the random variable maximum of the first
n − 1 observations. The agent knows its realization mn−1, as she knows the
realization qi of each random variable Qi with i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, results of all
the past observations. If she decides to stop and not to investigate the last
alternative, she can get a certain utility equal to mn−1 − (n − 1)c, while if
she decides to continue and explore the last alternative, she gets an uncertain
utility, whose expected value is equal to
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that then provides the optimal threshold in (7).
We may observe that it is never optimal to check the last alternative for
values of the unitary cost for investigation such that
c ≥ Q− 1
2
, (9)
as in this case, the right term of the inequality in (8) is always smaller than
or equal to 1, and then the inequality is never verified.
Step t: As before, we suppose that the consumer has already checked the
first t alternatives. Let Mt be the random variable maximum of the first t
observations. The agent knows its realization mt, as she knows the realization
qi of each random variable Qi with i ∈ {1, . . . , t}, results of all the past ob-
servations. Then, the proof follows exactly as for n − 1, providing the same
threshold which is then independent of the step t.
We observe that the optimal stopping rule strongly depends on the cost
factor c. In particular, when the cost is really small, it is convenient for the
agent to check for all the available alternatives. In fact, in such a case, the
threshold turns out to be smaller than the minimum feasible value of mt,
and then the inequality is always verified. On the other side, while the cost
for investigation is increasing, it is convenient for the agent to speed up in
choosing an option. In fact, in such a case the threshold is on the right of the
minimum feasible mt. In our analysis, we will investigate the model for two
unit costs: a low one, cl, and a high one ch, representing two different kinds
of consumers. The first one is more exigent, and she dwells on reading deeply
the reviews, whereas the second one gets a look and goes further. Assuming
a uniform distribution of quality products is a good approximation when the
consumer ignores the strategy that the platform has adopted for showing the
goods. This assumption provides us with a threshold which is optimal in this
specific context, but which may not be optimal when the consumer has more
information about the possible distribution of the quality. What happens in
reality, in fact, is that the platform defines an ordering method, in particular
a decreasing rating based ordering, and a decreasing price based ordering. In
these settings, the quality of the goods are then not uniformly distributed
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anymore, and the consumer could infer this information by the knowledge of
the proposed ordering. Indeed, getting the distribution of the quality could be
way too complicated for the consumer, who must devote time and attention
for decoding all the information signals useful for a quality evaluation.
5.3 Optimal Search
In this section, we illustrate the consumer searching behaviour we adopt in our
model. We suppose that the consumer enters the products page of an online
retailer, and she is going to explore some items. In our setting, the consumer
does not know exactly the product to search for, but she just has an idea about
some product features, and she is submitted to a budget constraint p̄. As final
goal, she aims at finding a good quality product in a short time. Generally
speaking, a user whose goal is refining the products’ exploration, can make
some actions: activating search filters (checking boxes of product attributes),
consulting the retailer’s recommendation system or querying the local search
engine. Since, in our setting, the user does not known the product, the simplest
way to convey his preferences, is switching on the attribute product filters for
selecting the favourite sort. In our assumptions, compliant to the vast majority
of the platforms, she has three by default ways of sorting the products: by
price, by rating and random. We assume that the consumer learns prices
and rating at a fixed cost for each item retrieved (as said before, we suppose
two alternative unit costs: low one cl and high one ch). In this way, we can
formulate a linear growth of global cost for searching.
Given a way of sorting the products, a consumer may terminate the search-
ing as soon as she reaches an option whose price is below her budget constraint.
Conversely, a consumer adopting a stopping rule is submitted to a more so-
phisticated decision mechanism. In particular, a consumer adopting our SR,
terminates the searching as soon as both the price and the quality constraints
are met (see Theorem 1). Our goal is to demonstrate that a consumer who
searches a product and adopts our stopping rule, increments her expected util-
ity with respect to what she could get without it. In fact, by means of the
data contained in our dataset, we show that our mechanism is successful at
increasing the average quality of product found.
It is worth noting that our results concern the product click rate44, rather
than the effective product purchasing action, on which we do not have data.
However, as some literature points out (see Donnelly[26]), clicking and pur-
chasing are two actions which are strongly correlated, to such an extent that
the click rate can be adopted for both consumer surplus estimation and plat-
form revenue ([26]).
44As Koulayev[32] underlines: “it is understood that the characteristic of good that af-
fects how consumers search would also change how consumers click.[...] these changes are
concerned with clicks on organic search results, whose quality is an important determinant
of consumer satisfaction with the platform. Thus, both consumers and platforms owners
are interested in maximizing the click rate on the platform”.
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The identification problem Let us show our optimal sequential search,
introducing an identification problem. As Koulayev points out [32]) “the full
identification of a search model requires that we are able to uniquely recover
the joint distribution of preferences, search costs, and beliefs”. About con-
sumer tastes, we identify her wishes through the search mode (rating/price).
Mimicking Koulayev “we assume that consumer beliefs can be reasonably ap-
proximated by the empirical distribution of product prices and qualities”. In
our assumptions, the consumer tries different search mode combination, com-
pliant to those admitted by the platform. The goal is to maximize her utility,
retrieving the best quality product in a minimum time, among all the attempts
that she has tried. For this purpose, we begin identifying the search model
provided by the SR, to which of the alternative model without the SR.
5.3.1 Search with SR
Recall that in defining our stopping rule, for an ordering {q1, . . . , qn} the aim
was to find the optimal stopping time t (i.e., the threshold on the quality)
which maximizes the utility function in equation (6). In the previous Section,
we have proposed a solution to this problem assuming a default static sorting
(i.e., when the ordering q1, . . . , qn was given randomly following a uniform
distribution sorting). Now, we generalize this setting toward dynamic search
specifications (i.e., when the ordering is chosen according to some specific
criteria) and we apply the same stopping rule and check for its effects on this
specific ordering of the qualities.
In particular, we assume that a consumer entering the platform can choose
a search mode s ∈ S = {by Rating, by Price, Random}. For each specification
of the variable s, the platform provides an ordering of the products, according
to a function Sort:S → Q · · · Q. This function can be understood as a map
between s toward an ordered tuple {q1, . . . , qn}.
We assume a discrete population of agents {1, . . . , K}, whose reservation
prices p̄k for each k ∈ {1, . . . , K} are uniformly distributed in P = [pmin, pmax].
This range represents the market price segment, within which it is carried out
the search (eg.: see Section 3.3: Price segments). Similarly, each agent k is
provided by one of two possible unit costs of searching ck ∈ C = {cl, ch}.
Then, the utility function of a consumer k when she is selecting a product
implementing our stopping rule is given by a function USRk (p̄k, ck, s) : P C
S → R that, given a tuple (p̄k, ck, s), assigns the corresponding value of the
utility in equation (6) when the price threshold is given by p̄k, the cost of
searching by ck, the ordering of the products quality by Sort(s) and when the
consumer stops searching when the price threshold is verified, and when the
quality threshold in Theorem 1 is verified as well45.
45If we try a more detailed comparison with Koulayev[32], despite the utility function of his
work takes into accounts more arguments, its form can be reduced to: uij = µ(pj , not_pj)+
εij where pj is the price of product j, not_pj is the not-price characteristic of product j, and
εij is the alternative shock interpreted as uncertainty of consumer i about the value of search
(e.g., future search cost)[32]. Our function can be splitted in price and not-price values too
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Fixing a reservation price p̄k, if we attempt all the specifications ck and s




USRk (p̄k, ck, s)
46
.
In our model, we suppose each agent k will click on the product gk corre-
sponding uniquely to the utility u∗(p̄k) that make her reach the best quality
result of all the specifications of ck and s. We observe that ∀ p̄k ∈ P we ob-
tain a value u∗(p̄k) that we will fit to a continuous function compliant to this
discretization.
5.3.2 Search without SR
The description of this case is simpler. The utility function UNOSR(p̄k) when
the consumer is not implementing the SR, is given by the utility she gets when
she purchase the first product which respect the price constraint UNOSR(p̄k) =
first{q1, . . . , qt|pt < p̄k}−ct. The corresponding u∗
NOSR
(p̄k) is calculated in the
same way of SR case.
6 Estimation
The value u∗(p̄k), given a reservation price pk is achieved maximizing a set
of values, each of which is in turn the result of another maximum provided
by the SR formula. Informally, we have achieved a set of maximal values,
each of them is the best value retrieved among each search specification. The
estimation of this class of problems is approached by literature through the
Generalized Extreme Value distribution of Type-I (GEV-I), also called Gumbel
distribution47. Practically the Gumbel is a distribution of a set of distributions.
This type of distribution is adopted as closed-form expression for estimation
utility function in optimal search problems by authors already mentioned here:
Koulaev[32], De los Santos[15], Honka[23]48.
(the quality, which is none other than an aggregation of not-price attributes). About the
term εij that estimates the uncertainty, our model does not provide this, because we consider
that the SR applied to the quality absorbs endogenously any consumer incertitude.
46The existence of a unique value is not assured. However, the probability to find a higher
number of maxima, when implementing it on our dataset, is negligible.
47The Gumbel distribution is used to represent the maximum or minimum of a number
of samples of size n, of various distributions. Let us make an example: supposing we are
interested in the biggest wave for a century, if there was a list of maximum waves for the past
ten years. It is useful in predicting the probability that an extreme seaquake hits a bridge
or a port. This distribution is studied in an area of statistics that is known as extreme value
theory.
48In the wake of Koulaev[32] and Honka[23], we simulate the consumers’ Utility through
a Gumbel CDF distribution, simplifying their framework. Koulaev uses a combination of
EV-I distributions, because he is interested in the utilities chain estimation of all the search
attempts, until the stopping of decision mechanism. Honka adopts EV distribution of prices,
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For each consumer k, provided by a reservation price p̄k, we can observe the
best quality products Ĝ = {ĝk}, each one retrieved by a search specification
Sort(c,s) (p̄k, ·, ·). We call this product the clicked-price product, because it is
the best quality product reached by a reservation price. In order to extend
the discrete list of consumers to a continuous distribution, we estimate the
likelihood that a consumer k can reaches gk, for all p ∈ [pmin, pmax], then
we fit Ĝ to a Gumbel cumulative distribution function G(p). The function
represents the maximum expected utility value that a consumer equipped with








The equation in (10) defines the consumer utility continuous function u∗(p).
Gumbel distribution A random variable x has a Gumbel distribution if
its probability density function PDF is defined by (11) and its cumulative
distribution CDF defined by (12)



















• This is a location-scale family of distributions, where µ is the location
and σ > 0 the scale.
Graphical representation of Gumbel CDF, setting different values of (µ, σ),
in red µ = 0, σ = 1.















showing that the maximum utility function is in turn a EV distribution. In these models,
the utility is a linear combination of price and not-price characteristics. Both the authors
use a multivariate scaled logistic CDF to estimate the parameters.
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Let pg1 , . . . , pgn the prices of product instances of our sample G (as a par-
ticular case of x1, . . . , xn random sample), the "Log Maximum Likelihood"
function of CDF is given by the equation below49.


















The parameters estimation is obtained by:
























In our case, (µ, σ) are respectively the location and the common scale of
the observed prices.
6.1 Results
We explicitly apply the search process, as it is defined in Section 5.3, to var-
ious set of data. The process is drawn by a Sort function Sort(c,s) (p̄k, ·, ·)
as (c, s) change: c ∈ C = {cl = 0.07, ch = 0.15}, s ∈ S = {by Rating,
by Price, Random} and reservation price p̄k ∈ P = {p̄1, .., p̄K} uniformly
distributed in [pmin, pmax]. In our simulation the enumeration of all sets is:
c = 2, #s = 3, k ∈ {1, .., 100}. The two borders [pmin, pmax] represent the
market price segments {Low Price, Medium-Low Price, Medium-High Price,
High Price} described in (Section 3.3). For each segment the magnitude of all
combination is #600, for all segments is #2400.
6.1.1 Benefit and Search Cost
Our scope is to estimate which is the optimal quality product, its price p∗g
and the search cost #steps retrieved by the best search matching. We inves-
tigate around four product price segments of Camera category drafted before
(eg.: see Section 3.3: Price segments), considering two search specifications:
Sort({cl,ch},s) with SR and without. In each of which, the consumer will pick the
49All the code used for this paper is available from ("https://github.com/
maroccasting/economics-experiments").
For the estimation, we use a package python scipy.stats focused on distribution fitting.
Among various MLE fitting algorithms, we adopt the implementation of method of the
moments. This implementation gives a goodness of fit.
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product g ∈ G provided by the largest benefit, as it is defined in equation(10),
giving the reserved price p̄k. We remember that this product satisfies the max
quality reached in the range [pmin, p̄k]. The Gumbel CDF in equation (12) is
the distribution that we are going to fit. MLE of Gumbel CDF distribution
maximizes the probability to be compliant to the values observed, estimating
the best parameters location µ and scale σ, as in equation (13). In the first 2
columns of table 10 we show the location estimation µ and the st. error for
each specification with SR and without. Comparing the location parameter
of the fitted CDF50 SR driven p∗gSR with the alternative without SR p
∗
gNOSR ,
in the first case the price is lower than the second one. This implies that
the consumer, through the SR mechanism, can reach a more quality cheaper
product with more probability.
We show also the quality and the search cost of such a product. The dif-
ference between quality product SR driven and the alternative without, is
always > 7% in each price segment, reached at a lower average price. We ob-
serve the best SR contribution, in terms of quality and search cost, is reached
for Medium-High price segment. Whereas for cheapest products the absolute
benefit is lower and the cost highest. The higher price difference (p∗gSR - p̄)
and the higher quality difference (q∗gSR - q̄) with respect to the median, give an
idea of the contribution of the tool with respect to a simple sorting by price.
For a panorama of detailed attempts see the table 15 at page 84 and the table
16 at page 85.
Table 10: Price, Search cost and Quality of optimum Clicked-product under different
specification
Price segment clicked Price ($) Search cost Quality
SortSR SortNO SR SortSR SortNO SR SortSR SortNO SR
Low 15.7 (0.04) 14.1 (0.03) 6 4 0.88 0.75
Medium-Low 51.2(0.09) 54.3 (0.05) 5 2 0.9 0.85
Medium-High 155.2 (0.08) 164.5 (0.04) 3 2 0.93 0.85
High 432.4 (0.09) 411.8 (0.11) 4 2 0.9 0.83
# sample 600 600 600 600 600 600
Log likelihood -38.75 -37.52
p-value (mean) 0.07 0.08
Notes: The clicked price is an optimal estimated value. The search cost and quality are referred to the
actually close product. Search cost is (# steps), Quality is normalize to 1.
50The fitted CDF is the price p∗gSR for which the consumer optimizes its benefit. This
value is an estimated value, involving the ideal product close to the actual best quality one.
From a statistical p.o.v. the location is the argmax of PDF density function.
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Table 11: Median of Price, Rating and Quality values for each product segment
Price segment Price ($)mean (sd)
Rating Quality
SR NoSR SR NoSR
Low 16 (7.4) 4.4 4.3 0.82 0.56
Medium-Low 54 (21) 4.3 4 0.83 0.75
Medium-High 164 (35) 4.4 4.2 0.92 0.78
High 598 (220) 4.6 4.6 0.85 0.75
Notes: Search cost (# steps), Rating, Quality column with and without SR. Mean values [High unit cost
ch=0.15]
6.1.2 Stocastic Dominance
The simulation of the model has empirically shown that, given an i.i.d distribu-
tion of agents, facing two specifications of search modes, SortSR and SortNOSR,
the benefit of the best quality product reached by SR is higher than the al-
ternative NOSR. However, for each price segment, the result is obtained only
for the argmax of the density function (the first derivative of our utility dis-
tribution function), and does not concern the full range of prices [pmin, pmax].
To extend the point-wise result to the domain level, we are going to estimate
the first-order dominance of SR specification comparing the alternative.
Although in economics the notion of stochastic dominance is generally referred
to maximizing expected utilities between two or more lotteries, we can try to
apply it to the distribution utility function proposed in the previous Section.
the Stochastic dominance is a partial order between random variables, useful
to make a decision over some preferences. In light of this, giving two generic
distribution functions F (x) and G(x), a decision maker that observes a First-
order stochastic dominance, within a range of x ∈ [xmin, xmax] can make a
decision formally based on the best benefit received.
First-order dominance definition. For any distribution function F (x) and
G(x), F (x) first-order stochastically dominates G(x) if F (x) ≥ G(x) ∀x.
We apply the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test51, to verify for which price segment
51The python scipy.stats implementation specifies the null hypothesis that the true
distribution function of x is equal to, not less than or not greater than the distribution





the SR distribution dominates the NOSR distribution. Supposing a signifi-
cance level α = 0.01. We find for low-level price segment a p-value = 0.002,
for medium-high price segment p-value = 0.001 and for high price segment a
p-value = 0.005. Since p < α in this three case we can reject the null hypothe-
sis. Whereas in low-high price segment p-value = 0.023 then we cannot reject
the null hypothesis. In fact for some product belonging to this segment, the
utility value is higher without SR, as reported in same case of the table 15 at
page 84 and the table 16 at page 85.
6.1.3 Price elasticity of demand
The literature with which we compare our model, simulates the price elasticity
of demand, by measuring the variation in volume of retrieved products (by a
search mechanism specification) in response to a variation in price52. Accord-
ing to Kim et al.[31], in our model, the own-price elasticity of demand (εsearch)
is seen as a percentage change in expected click rate of retrieved products
following one percent increase in price. Practically, we predict the volume of
retrieved products through different consumer search settings, as the marginal
price changes. Our scope is to evaluate, essentially in which way, and for which





Where p+1% represents an increment of 1 unit in price and Qp+1% the com-
parative quantity affected by the price increment, dQty = Qty −Qp+1%ty and dp
= p− p+1%. Given a product i the definition εsearchi is applied to this product.
We observe that our measure concerns the own-price elasticity of demand
of single products. Whereas the cross-price elasticity of demand shows how
quantity demand measure the effects of related goods. To evaluates these ef-
fects, it needs a basket containing more closely substitutable products, difficult
to collect in our dataset.
Resuming the conditions of search setting (see Section 5.3: Optimal Search),
we explain exactly how the quantity of products is calculated. Giving a con-
sumer k provided with a reservation price p̄k and two search specifications:
Sort({cl,ch},s) with SR and without. In each of which, the consumer will pick
the product gi ∈ G provided by the largest benefit. we define the cardinality
of the product #{gi} =
∑K
k=1 #gik as the amount of occurrences are retrieved
as k changes. According to the price elasticity of demand definition, it easy
52In De los Santos[15], the formula is more complicate, but essentially the author calcu-
lates the average change in buying probability of a marginal increasing of price (taking in
account either the product price and the average of the expected price distributions in the
marketplace).
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to see that the quantity Qty(i) in (14) is the cardinality #{gi}53. To take an
example, εi= -0.5 means that if we increase the price of product i by 1%, its
search quantity will drop by 0.50%. We apply the same experimental setting
used in Section 6.1: Results54.
Table 12: Price elasticity of demand (low price)
Product Name Brand Price ($) Rating Quality εSRi εNO SRi
Wasabi Power Battery (2-Pack) Wasabi 21 4.5 0.85 -0.9 -1.3
Mediabridge Ultra Series RCA Mediabridge 11 4.4 0.85 -0.8 -1
Micra Digital CAT5 Cable Belkin 11 4.4 0.22 -2.1 -3.5
Anker® Golden AC Adapter Anker 18 4.0 0.45 -2.0 -2.3
Table 13: Price elasticity of demand (high price)
Product Name Brand Price ($) Rating Quality εSR εNO SR
Pentax K-5 16.3 MP Pentax 370 4.8 1.0 -0.2 -0.4
Canon G12 10 MP Digital Camera Canon 598 4.4 0.82 -0.5 -0.5
Nikon D3100 DSLR Camera Nikon 440 4.6 0.6 -0.1 -0.4
Canon SX30IS 14.1MP Digital Camera Canon 450 4.0 0.77 -0.3 -0.3
Generally speaking, the results on price elasticity of demand point out to
the product quality and brand incidence in click rate. The SR affects only the
results for low price products demand (see table 12 at page 75). Taken into
exam two products, Mediabridge Ultra Series RCA and Micra Digital CAT5,
the first one is a cable that has remained popular for 8 years until 2014, whereas
the second one has disappeared in few time, due to obsolete technology, despite
having the same rating. The elasticity of demand index, in the first case (with
and without SR), is relatively inelastic. Consumers that have purchased the
product still do if the price increases. Whereas, Micra Digital CAT5, with
low quality and higher negative elasticity has been exposed to the pitfalls of
the market. In the table 13, are illustrated high price products. Comparing
with the previous group, the quality in average is higher, and the elasticity in
average lower. In this segment, the brands are known and the brand loyalty
assures small changes in selling, when the price changes. In table 14 at page
76 we have compared the products by price segments, taking into account
the average elasticity in each segment. At Medium-High price level, as we
have already seen before, quality is higher and search cost lower (because the
53The cardinality of {gk} is affected by the change of reserved prices, because some queries
do not matching, whereas other ones retrieve the same product.
54The values of price data are referred to the 2014, the last year of running the scraping
process of our dataset. All the values are referred to this period and not updated now.
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probability to reach early the maximum quality product increases). This flat
effect reduces in this task the difference between SR and NO SR. When the
range of prices confines the luxury segment of the market category, people are
disposed to buy the loyal products, even if the price increases. The demand
is relatively inelastic (-1 < ε < 0) with an average value of -0.5 with SR and -
0.35 without. At the contrary, in accessories segment, the stickiness to brand
awareness fails, and the consumer makes more attention to price increasing,
except in the cases of high quality products.
We confirm the results obtained by Kim et al.[31], a similar work focused to
a very close market category (camcorder). For example, the Sony camcorder
with DVD media format, 40×optical zoom, selling at $360 has a ε = −2.12,
where the cheapest product ($32) has ε = −0.58.
Table 14: Price segments comparison
Price segment ($) Elasticity εSR NO SR
Low price < 30 -2.0 -2.4
30 ≤ Medium-Low Price < 120 -1.4 -1.5
120 ≤ Medium-High Price < 250 -0.7 -0.7
High Price ≥ 250 -0.5 -0.35
Notes: in each line the average elasticity among the products of the same segment.
7 Discussion and Conclusion
Discussion and comparison with other models
In this article, we have described a model of consumer search for products,
exploiting a decision-making mechanism based on a Stopping Rule (SR). The
SR permits choosing the highest quality product in a sequential search be-
tween n alternatives, with respect to the minimization of search costs. Unlike
many sequential search models, our implementation does not merely illustrate
a consumer behaviour, but can make a decision, replacing the incertitude of
the consumer. In other words, it can be used as a platform design tool for
helping the consumer in their choices. There are two main differences between
our model and the classical sequential search models, proposed by McCall[36].
First of all, our aim is to maximize quality rather than minimizing the tar-
get price, which is the aim of classical models where the product is known.
Secondly, the vast majority of the models proceeds by attempts, evaluating
in each step the difference between next expected utility and reserved ones
already estimated, whereas our design terminates after a one-stage decision.
Quoting Kim et al. “the theory of optimal sequential search states that con-
sumers only continue to search if the marginal benefits of doing so outweigh the
marginal costs”[31]. Specifically, in the classical models, given a distribution
of prices F (p) and a reservation price pr, a consumer chooses a specification
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to optimize the number of steps (search) to find a price close to pr. Following
this process, the consumer can formulate expectations about new price quote
(the benefit) and evaluate uncertainty regarding the search (e.g.: future search
marginal cost). Such a goal is achieved by gathering additional price infor-
mation to determine the expected benefit of search. Practically, by means of
a first attempt, the consumer obtains a minimal amount of knowledge about
price distribution, and actualizes the belief of alternative events. The recent
approaches are different because they take into account not only known prod-
ucts, but also unknown ones. This behavior is more compliant to consumer
attitude in searching on platforms, because the daily growth of products makes
for detailed knowledge about unknown new items difficult to discern. Search-
ing new products shifts consumer attention to maximizing utility instead of
minimizing prices. The studies interested in this new fuzzy consumer knowl-
edge, apply a structural change for sequential search. The step-wise inference
engine must be oriented to alternatives to the exact product name given that
this is lost in this kind of mechanism. The most attractive are the not-price
product attributes, such as those used by Kim et al.[31] and Koulayev[32]55.
One of the best models that has embarked upon this new style, is developed
by Koulayev[32]), in which the author estimates a joint distribution between
product characteristics and consumer taste, over more than twenty attributes.
Concerning our work, the evaluation of the best consumer utility is based
on a SR mechanism, which stops at a good enough choice (under a budget
constraint). The stopping decision is made when the best quality item, with
respect to the search cost, is reached. The quality index is able to digest not-
price attributes, after evaluating them through an exogenous statistical learn-
ing algorithm. In the light of this solution, the stopping mechanism needs only
a list of past value observations of quality signals, and a condition rule about
the expected new alternatives. The target argument is a value, not a complex
function. This value concentrates the quintessence of information quality. In
the First Chapter, we have described its formulation process, starting with
a function that includes many variables, that has been reduced to a simple
value of product quality. The choice turned out to be good in many cases, as
we have shown in our results. The critical conditions are represented by the
heterogeneous distribution of price and information, that happens when we
enlarge the searching domain. In the worst case, through One-shot attempt,
some higher quality products are ranked after the stopping step. Under these
55To have an idea, two classes of attributes are taken into account: one is composed by
product features, such as those made available by consumer reviews collections like Con-
sumer Reports Magazine: weight, design, size, reliability, usability, and so forth. Another
class is formed by check box attributes for filtering, generally placed on the left of platform
product pages. Other than the rating, and other common features, depend on the specific
product category (eg.: in the case of hotels: facilities, room service, panorama, breakfast,
cleaning, comfort and so forth). Consumer Reports Magazine is an American nonprofit
consumer organization dedicated to unbiased product testing. It provides the latest ratings
and reviews plus rigorous reporting on issues with worldwide impacts. The vast majority of
online platforms has followed this setting, exposing product information through UCG.
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circumstances, alternative methods are to be preferred, specifically those that
estimate the best utilities by trial and check. However, the heterogeneity can
be reduced, by setting a partition of price segments like our experiment design.
This condition, adopted by other authors such Kim et al.[31], does not limit
idiosyncratic consumer taste, because searching for products over a large price
range is improbable.
Conclusion
An important contribution of our research is investigating in price differentia-
tion for searching. In particular, for different price segments: low priced prod-
ucts (accessories), medium priced (the target market of the camera category)
and high priced ones (eg.: luxury market), with respect to product quality.
We discover that, in the range of prices where the information is dense and
more uniformly distributed among products, like medium-high price in camera
electronic market, the rating of known brands remains a good proxy for the
quality index, as predicted in most of the literature. This standard assumption
is not true for accessories, for which the rating is not the best measure of qual-
ity. The greatest usefulness of the SR arises exactly in this segment. Finally,
we have explored the quantitative implications of our proposed model by trac-
ing the cost distribution within price segments. In medium-high level, the SR
benefits in terms of reducing costs are proportional to advantages in terms of
average product quality. The difference between the two settings, with SR and
without, is 17% in best product quality. While, for the lowest price, the best
benefit in quality difference between SR and No SR is higher 26%. The result
has been achieved by paying a higher search cost. We have also estimated
the price elasticity of demand with and without SR, by changing different pa-
rameters and search conditions. In particular, the SR offers visibility to the
unbranded tools and components that still play a relevant role to support new
design in searching tools. The estimates of utility parameters under different
specifications highlights the search by rating with SR, as the best tool to cap-
ture optimal product quality. From the "Information Retrieval" point of view,
this improvement can be seen as a re-ranking solution, potentially deliverable
through an external add-on. We may conclude that, in many of the cases, the
SR guarantees an higher utility, with respect to the traditional cases. This
result is reflected by the shape of the utility curve, which dominates for all the
reservation prices. The best result is achieved in the medium-high price group
(100-240$), because it is the most competitive niche camera category, which
shows the best average quality and proportionally best rating, and where the
reviewers write the most interesting reports.
Definitively, we have crossed three different branches of study: (i) First of all,
the Consumer Search on platform, which is the main research line of this paper,
focused on a new model oriented toward reaching the optimal consumer util-
ity (ii) Stopping Rule mechanism, typical of exploration-exploitation trade-off
(see March[34]), in particular the Secretary problem (see Ferguson[19]) and
(iii) Statistical learning algorithm concerning the evaluation of quality prod-
uct through reviews content. The third, discovered and illustrated in the First
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Chapter, turns out to be the ideal ingredient for a menu that mixes computer
science research with economics of information.
Future research
Our work still has two limitations: the fact the sample is composed of only 100
elements and the unique market category of our sample. As future research
we underline the need of generalizing our findings by applying our framework
to other categories, such as book markets, and on a much larger sample.
Another interesting improvement would be to study the performance of the
SR mechanism when assuming decreasing costs (because the consumer, after
some steps, has already formed a rough idea about the reviews content, and
we can assume it would be less costly for her to get more information in her
search while time is passing).
Towards a perspective of market design evaluation, a future research con-
cerns to describe a complete model of supply and demand. This model may
be represented applying the tools of Game Theory, via a strategic setting in
which n sellers (each one produces only one product) compete by choosing
a strategy in the form of a pair (price, quality). In such a setting, when
a platform decides to propose new products sorting (eg.: implementing our
quality index), the sellers can react strategically and modify the price or the
quality, in order not make their position worst, in the proposed sorting. In
this condition, the consumers do not act strategically, and they have only the
passive role of observing the search results and making the suggested choice.
Assuming a dynamic setting, suppose a seller who strategically decreases the
price or increases the quality in order to become more competitive. The other
sellers, as competitors, can react by trying the best response to such a change.
Such a game is interesting for evaluating price differentiation and total rev-
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A Parameters Comparison under different spec-
ification
In table 15 and 16 at pages 84 and 85 we described search cost (number of
steps), rating and product quality, calculated in the three searching mode:
(by Price, by Rating and Random), at the two unit cost of search in the two
cases: SR and NoSR. All these valued are referred to the median reservation
price of each segment. The results with SR show higher product quality with
respect to the alternative without (in only one case among 15 the stopping
rule performs worse).
Search by Rating represents the basic proof of measuring the performance of
our stopping rule implementation, because put in evidence that the rating
system is not always a good index for quality evaluation. In fact, for prices
less than 100$ (in which the variance of rating is higher, and the mean lower)
the rule confirms an increment in average quality maintaining the same level
of rating, as shown in table 15 at page 84. In the case of Medium-high and
High prices the rating is directly proportional to the quality. In Search by
Price specification, without stopping rule the result achieved is the bottom
product price. Adopting the Stopping Rule. it is a balance between the basic
order by Price, and the more priced item providing a not inferior quality.
The tables 17 at page 86 and 18 at page 86, summarize the results of the big
tables 15 and 16. We observe that, for low price and medium-low, the rating
is around 4.3 both for SR and No SR, but for low price, the quality of SR
is 0.30 higher, whereas for Medium-low one, the quality of SR is 0.11 higher.
That put in evidence the weak reliability of rating in the accessories segment.
Changing the unit cost, from cl=0.07 to ch=0.15, the results with SR change
a bit. The search cost decreases (e.g.: for Low Price the average number of
steps turns from 6 to 4.2), but also the quality. Note As the rating of product,
we assume the average rating of all the reviews. It is important to observe
that this is not exactly what a platform usually does, when they show a rating
value, but it may differ of some points percentage from the other one. For



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 17: product-clicked values of parameters. Low cost searching
Price segment Price ($)mean (sd)
Steps Rating Quality
SR NoSR SR NoSR SR NoSR
Low 16 (7.4) 6 1 4.4 4.3 0.85 0.56
Medium-Low 54 (21) 4.2 1.3 4.2 4 0.88 0.69
Medium-High 164 (35) 3.3 1.7 4.3 4.2 0.99 0.78
High 598 (220) 5.3 1.3 4.6 4.6 0.88 0.59
Notes: # Steps, Rating, Quality column with and without SR. Mean values [Low unit cost ch=0.07]
Table 18: product-clicked values of parameters. High cost searching
Price segment Price ($)mean (sd)
Steps Rating Quality
SR NoSR SR NoSR SR NoSR
Low 16 (7.4) 4.2 1 4.4 4.3 0.82 0.56
Medium-Low 54 (21) 4.0 1.3 4.3 4 0.83 0.69
Medium-High 164 (35) 3.1 1.7 4.4 4.2 0.92 0.78
High 598 (220) 5.0 1.3 4.6 4.6 0.85 0.59
Notes: # Steps, Rating, Quality column with and without SR. Mean values [High unit cost ch=0.15]
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Chapter 3
Price Matching and Platform Pricing
Abstract
In this study we investigate the effects of Price Matching Guarantees (PMG)
commercial policies on U.S. online consumer electronics daily prices. By ap-
plying a Diff-in-Diff identification strategy we find evidence in favor of price
reductions occurring after the PMG policy is repealed.
We further investigate if such effect is heterogeneous according to products
characteristics, by exploiting User Generated Contents (products popularity
and quality) and online search visibility measures (Google Search Rank). Es-
timates suggest that for high quality (visibility) products PMG policies harms
competition by keeping prices high, while for low quality (visibility) products,
prices decrease during the policy validity period.
1 Introduction
Online sales platforms have recently gained increasing importance in both re-
tail and wholesale markets.56 Such markets are characterized by the supply
of personalized services, more convenient delivery schedules and the ability
to reach a very high number of consumers. In addition, platforms claim to
warrant lower prices with respect to traditional stores through the provision
of offers, promotions, down prices and other price discounting policies. Among
these options, online sales platforms often implement Price Matching Guaran-
tees policies (PMG), that is the promise to reimburse price differences when
competitors offer a lower prices.57
PMG policies are surely appealing for customers and can increase con-
sumer confidence and brand fidelity. However, the announcement to tie prices
to those of competitors can have anti-competitive effects and sustain high
prices, thus harming consumers welfare.
56The term “online platform” identifies a range of digital services that facilitates inter-
actions between two or more distinct but interdependent sets of users (whether firms or
individuals) who interact through the service via the Internet [31]. Online sales platforms
can operate as online retailers, as a marketplace for third-party sellers or they can offer both
services.
57For example, NewEgg PMG policy states that "if you purchase an item from
Newegg.com which is carrying the Price Match Guarantee badge at the time of purchase,
then find the exact same item at a lower price by Newegg or a major retailer, just let us
know, and we’ll send you a Newegg Customer Care Card to cover the difference". See
https://kb.newegg.com/knowledge-base/price-match-guarantee/.
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Most of theoretical literature agrees on the fact that PMG reduce firms incen-
tive to compete on prices and lower the motivation for consumers to search
better sale conditions [20; 34]. However, in some models, PMG are considered
as tools for price discriminating or as real discounting policies [5; 32]. There-
fore, empirical analyses become particularly relevant in order to understand
under what conditions such pricing policies reduce consumer welfare. Indeed,
the applied literature analyzing this issue is scant and does not provide con-
clusive results [27; 38].
Our work add to this literature by providing empirical evidence on the
effect of platforms Price Matching Guarantees policies on daily consumer elec-
tronics prices observed on US online market. We have focused on the NewEgg
platform that exclusively sells consumer electronics products and implements
PMG policies that turn on and off over time (blinking PMG). Given that our
identification strategy is based on a comparison of price levels before and af-
ter the policy shutdown, we excluded platforms that never stop offering PMG
(like Target).
In particular, we apply a Diff-in-Diff (DiD) approach where we consider as
the treated sample the pool of NewEgg products interested by PMG policies.
Differently from standard practices in studies adopting a DiD approach, we
build the control sample with price data for the same products observed on a
different platform, namely Amazon, that never offers PMG to customers. Fur-
thermore, in order to ensure that our counterfactual sample is less likely to be
influenced by the PMG policy adopted by NewEgg, we have considered data
from the Amazon UK platform, instead of Amazon US. Indeed, price observed
on Amazon US might not be completely independent from the policy under
scrutiny, because of price tracking practices frequently adopted by platforms.
Estimates provide evidence in favor of an average price reduction of about
3.9% after the interruption of the PMG policy. However, in order to have a
more detailed picture of the issue, we investigate if such effect is heterogeneous,
depending on products characteristics. In particular, we focus on products fea-
tures that might affect the outcome of PMG policies and that can be recovered
exclusively on online markets. Platform data allow us to obtain information
from User Generated Contents (UGC), like product popularity, product qual-
ity and online search visibility (Google Search Rank); indeed, we believe that
these product characteristics might provide indirect information on consumers
heterogeneity. Estimates conducted on specific sub-samples show that when
the PMG is interrupted, low quality (and low search rank) products experi-
ence a price increase of about 3.4%, while for high quality (and high visibility)
products a price reduction of about 3.7% is observed. These findings are in
line with the lack of unambiguous predictions of the theoretical literature.
The anti-competitive effects of PMG observed for high quality (visibility)
products has been predicted by theoretical models where such polices make
collusion more likely [7; 20; 34]. These findings can be also explained by the
theoretical predictions of a class of models, like Corts [14] and Nalca et al.
[30], where PMG is a tool for discriminating customers according to their sen-
sitiveness to price and products quality. These models also explain our results
obtained for products characterized by low visibility (quality). Indeed, the will-
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ingness to engage in search activity could indirectly identify those customers
whose demand is more rigid, as argued by the search literature [17].
The analysis conducted in this study enriches the literature on the price
effects of PMG by using very detailed platform daily price data for a specific
market (consumer electronics) where such policies are very common. First,
our work overcomes previous research (see Zhuo 38) by using real-time data
instead of historical information. This makes the use of price tracking websites
and algorithms that extract data from price charts outdated.
Second, the DiD identification strategy adopted is based on the construction of
a control group with a novel approach; finally , products characteristics based
on Users Generated Contents (UGC) are employed for the first time in order
to study possible heterogeneous effects of such policies.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we briefly
discuss related literature and in Section 3 we accurately describe the data
extraction process and the variables used in the empirical analysis. Section
4 explains our identification strategy and in Section 5 we discuss estimates
results and robustness analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
The theoretical literature has analysed possible impacts of Price Matching
Guarantees (PMG) on different market outcomes, since such commercial poli-
cies might affect the behaviour of firms and consumers in different ways.
The most common prediction of the theoretical models is that price matching
guarantees hamper competition by keeping prices high and sustaining collu-
sive practices; moreover, some authors suggest that they might be tools for
realising price discrimination or signalling cheap prices.
Hay [20], Salop [34] and Belton [5] have first suggested that price matching
guarantees can sustain collusion in oligopoly models; they highlight that such
clauses might be considered as threats to punishment for firms that lower car-
tel prices, thus reducing firms incentive to deviate from the agreement. They
argue that, if all competitors in the market adopt a PMG policy, none of them
has the incentive to lower its price and the latter tends to the monopolistic
level. Moreover, they agree on the fact that the adoption of such policies in-
crease the stability of the cartel, as any price cut must be refunded to the
consumer, so that the policy generates a credible penalty system.
Several other papers support the pro-collusive argument by extending the ba-
sic oligopolistic setting (see among others Doyle [15], Logan and Lutter [25]
and Baye and Kovenock [4]), while other authors explore the impact of PMG
extending the analysis in dynamic, multi-stage and Hotelling frameworks (see
among others Chen [9], Lu and Wright [26], Hviid and Shaffer [23], Pollak et al.
[33], Constantinou and Bernhardt [13]). Cabral et al. [7] suggest that a PMG
can be a collusion enacting practice. In the model two firms alternate over
time in setting prices; given that starting a collusion process implies several
risks, like for example antitrust penalties, firms include collusion costs in their
decisions. The main prediction of the model is that the probability of tacit
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collusion rises when the policy is in place.
In studies reviewed so far, it is implicitly assumed that customers automati-
cally claim the price guarantee whenever they find a price differential: indeed,
this is not always the case, because of lack of information or because there
are small costs for the customer to activate a guarantee, the so called “has-
sle costs”. Hviid and Shaffer [22] highlight that the presence of hassle costs
undermines possible anti-competitive effects of PMG, but do not completely
cancel them. Precisely, with symmetric firms PMG are unable to support any
price increase in presence of hassle costs. Indeed, each firm will be interested
in lowering price levels by an amount that is marginally smaller than these
costs, so that buyers are attracted from cheaper firms and do not activate the
guarantee. Otherwise, with asymmetric firms, a rise in prices might be sup-
ported, but not at the monopolistic level. Moreover, their model can explain
why universal adoption is not a realistic assumption of previous studies.
Some other models explore the possibility that sellers use PMG policies as a
price discrimination tool. If customers are different in terms of some subjective
characteristic, like information on prices and guarantee terms, degree of loyalty
to a specific retailer or level of hassle costs in requesting the refund, firms could
use the price guarantee to discriminate between different groups of consumers.
Png and Hirshleifer [32], Belton [5] and Corts [14] first suggested duopoly
models where firms discriminate between different consumers groups, namely
“unsophisticated” customers and “sophisticated” ones. Consumer segmentation
and PMG allow firms to set higher prices for unsophisticated consumers, while
sophisticated ones benefit from the lowest price guaranteed by the policy. The
main intuition from this strand of literature is that price discrimination might
at least benefit some customers with actually lower prices.58
Finally Moorthy and Winter [28] suggest that PMG might be a credible signal
of low prices, if low cost firms adopt the policy and (high cost) competitors can
not match the policy. Similarly, Jain and Srivastava [24] develop a theoretical
model that identifies the conditions under which PMG might lead to lower
market prices.59 In the presence of informed and uninformed consumers (about
prices and store characteristics) and of different kind of stores (in terms of size,
service quality ans so on), only stores with low prices offer price-matching
policies.60
Despite the theoretical literature is rich and analyses several aspects of
price matching policies, the empirical evidence is scant and does not provide
conclusive results. Some studies focus on specific markets, like tyre or gaso-
line, while others analyze retailing prices from supermarkets, grocery stores or
online platform markets.
Analysing daily price quotes from the tyre industry advertisements, on 61
US Sunday newspapers observed for three months in 1996, Arbatskaya et al.
58Similar results can be found also in Edlin [16] and Nalca et al. [30].
59Authors have realized two experiments to analyze the effect of PMG policies on prices
consumer perceptions and have shown that consumers did expect lower prices from PMG.
60Similar results can be found also in Moorthy and Zhang [29].
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[1], through a Feasible Generalised Least Square approach, find weak evidence
of anti-competitive effects of PMG and show that an increase in the number of
firms implementing the policy leads to a 10% increase in prices.61 Cabral et al.
[7], focus instead on daily pricing policies adopted by the Shell network of gas
stations in Germany in 2015.62 Leveraging on gas stations localization and
consumers demographics as sources of identification, they suggest that PMG
can be a collusion enacting policy. Gas station prices have been analyzed also
by Byrne and De Roos [6] for Australia by means of a detailed 15 years time
series dataset. Authors argue that the majority of gas stations prices follow a
weekly cycle and that dominant firms can use PMG to coordinate market prices
and reduce price competition. Similar results can be found in Chilet [10], who
analyses pricing policies of three big retail pharmacy chains in Chile, observed
over the period 2006-2008. The author follows an identification strategy based
on the estimation of a demand model, in which quantity sold is a function of
the differences between own prices with the competitors ones, around the time
period where collusive price increases occurred.
Hess and Gerstner [21] analyse the effect of PMG on prices by collecting
weekly data of 114 goods sold in several US supermarkets and grocery stores,
from 1984 to 1986. Authors, by means of a time series analysis, provide evi-
dence in favor of higher prices of about 1-2% when the guarantee is introduced.
Moorthy and Winter [28] argue instead that the adoption or non-adoption of
the PMG might be interpreted as a way to signal the seller service–price pro-
file.63 Authors analyse data for several product categories from 46 Canadian
retailers observed in 2002. They assume the existence of informed and unin-
formed consumers and show that PMG might be a tool to signal low prices to
uninformed consumers. In particular, they find that PMG are mainly adopted
by low cost/low service chain stores. Similar results can be found in Chung
et al. [11] for three leading hypermarkets in Korea. Finally, Zhuo [38] focuses
on online platforms and collect US price data from online price trackers for
150 products offered on Amazon in 2012. The author observes prices during
and after the implementation of PMG policies by two big-box stores (Target
and Best Buy) targeted specifically on Amazon prices; by applying DiD and
RDD methods, the author suggests that prices increase by about six percent-
age points during the period of validity of the policy;64 moreover, the analysis
highlights an heterogeneous impact of PMG, with larger price increases for
initially lower-priced goods.65
61The same authors in Arbatskaya et al. [2] confirm their results by analysing the same
data with a different approach.
62See also Wilhelm [36].
63The authors refer to the retailer service-price profile as to any sellers characteristic that
might induce customers to choose one seller over another one, like better sales assistance
and customer care, a clear Web site, personalised delivery and selling services.
64Similar results can be found also in Wu et al. [37], Haruvy and Leszczyc [19].
65Some other authors analyse the impact of price-beating guarantees, that are less
widespread policies with similar terms as price matching ones (in price beating guaran-
tees refund exceeds the price difference). Studies that refer to these policies argue that,




In order to study the impact of PMG on prices, we focus on the online consumer
electronics market, since it is one of the most widespread sector on online re-
tailing and is often interested by such pricing policies. In particular, electronic
products are search goods, whose quality can be evaluated before the purchase:
the advent of online markets has made this process much cheaper and faster
and is most likely to affect the impact of such policies, whose outcome depends,
among other factors, by the level of search and hassle costs. Moreover, elec-
tronic goods are barely affected by seasonal effects, so that prices signals are
more stable over time and show low price differentials across countries [18; 35].
These characteristics allow us to improve the identification strategy through
the construction of a more refined control group (see the next section).
Among different online retailing platforms we choose to focus on NewEgg,
a leading online US retailer of consumer electronics products, that implements
a so-called blinking PMG, i.e. a price guarantee that turns on and off over
time on selected items. Given that our identification strategy is based on the
comparison of prices before and after a policy shutdown, we do not consider
platforms that apply PMG to wide groups of products continuously over time
(i.e. Target, among others). In particular, NewEgg communicates the period
of validity of the price guarantee by means of a label that appears on the
specific product online page; the customer who discovers the PMG badge has
14 calendar days of time to find the same title at a lower price from US
competitors belonging to a declared list.66 PMG policies are often repeated
over time on the same products without any notice, so that consumers looking
for deals have to exert an higher effort in the search process.
In order to build the sample we have identified 100 NewEgg products in-
terested by PMG on May 10th 2018. For such products we have collected price
data and the presence of the NewEgg PMG badge until 31st October 2018 (174
days and 9028 observations). We identify as the treatment of interest the in-
terruption of the PMG policy, so that prices observed on the NewEgg platform
represent the treated sample. The control sample has been built by recovering
price data for the same products observed on NewEgg but sold on the Amazon
UK platform, that never offers PMG policies.67 This reduces the number of
observed products, so that the final sample includes 29 products belonging to
19 sub-categories (computer hardware, tablet and computers, mobile phones,
printers and scanners, PC accessories, speakers for domotics, screens and au-
tice and likely be effective in enhancing competition. Experimental literature also focuses
on the effect of price matching and price-beating guarantees: however, experimental results
lack the complexity of real interactions between sellers and consumers.
66With title we refer to a product with the same brand and model number. NewEgg,
after checking the validity of the claim, sends a Customer Care Card to refund the price
difference (Source: https://kb.newegg.com/knowledge-base/price-match-guarantee/).
67See the next section for a rationale on this choice.
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dio devices). In the Appendix we provide a detailed list of selected products
(Tables 30 and 31).
It is worth noting that both Amazon and NewEgg operate either as online
retailers or markeplaces for third-party sellers who pay fees and royalties to
access to customer base. In such marketplace, online platforms often acts only
as a payment intermediary and goods are kept in the third-party sellers inven-
tory. Thus, in order to build a valid control group, we have excluded data on
products sold by third-party sellers on both Amazon and NewEgg platforms.
The retrieving of sample data has been a challenging task. Given the
absence of ready-made and easy-to-use repositories on price data, we have
developed an ad-hoc scraping program (in Python language) able to protect the
scraping process from unpredictable changes of the page and capable to recover
the data without stressing the site, thus limiting the risk of interruptions due
to firewalls.68 In particular, the scraping process has been supported by several
alert tools signalling periodical changes of the internal page structure.69
The process of data collection has required the daily implementation of
these main steps:
1. Sign up for subscription to Amazon Web Service (AWS) cloud, in order
to use virtual servers in which to install and launch the program;70
2. Accept the norms and terms of use of the platform site, in order to be
compliant to the server navigation policies;
3. Launch the daily loop process, in order to navigate among product pages,
select the field tags, get the data and save on a server disk. Each scraping
session runs about 20 minutes every day.
In addition to products daily prices retrieved on both platforms, we also
collect several product characteristics available exclusively on online sales plat-
forms. In particular, we recover some User Generated Content (UGC), like the
absolute number of reviews, received by the specific product under considera-
tion and the most popular one in the same subcategory, as the product rating;
moreover, from Google we perform and collect a product search rank.
The absolute number of reviews is a dynamic information which represents a
sort of popularity index, since it is proportional to the product market diffu-
sion.71 We also calculate the relative number of reviews as the ratio between
the number of reviews of each product and the amount of reviews received from
the most popular product in the same subcategory.72 This normalized index,
68A typical problem is to intercept daily changes of web pages not only about prices,
but also concerning other dynamic contents, such as the number of customer reviews, the
average rating and so forth. Code available from authors upon request.
69Indeed, platforms frequently change the deep structure of the page, in a not visible way
by the human reader but in a way that affects the program code and the scraping process.
70AWS is a comprehensive, evolving cloud computing platform provided by Amazon.
71In online commerce, product reviews are used by retailing platforms to give consumers
an opportunity to comment on products they have purchased, right on the product page.
72See Table 30 in Appendix for details.
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that ranges from zero to one, shows the relative popularity of the product with
respect to the other items of the same sub-category. We also collect data on
product ratings (stars) provided by consumers. We consider the number of
stars gained by each product, ranging from zero (low quality) to five (high
quality), as a proxy of product quality. Finally, we develop a search index as
a proxy of the time spent on search engines to discover the page of a certain
product. More precisely, the search index represents the probability to find
the product in the first ranked positions of Google results.73
It is worth noting that, although the products analysed are sold by Amazon
and NewEgg in different countries, information on some of the considered UGC
(e.g. rating) maintain their consistency. This property is typical of consumer
electronics goods that have a standardized nature. Concerning the search
index, we adopt a country specific value by launching the Google search engine
with specific country settings (UK and US).
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Our sample consists of 9028 daily price observations (174 days) for 29 products
observed on NewEgg and Amazon UK platforms, from 10 May 2018 until 31
October 2018. Table 19 shows the mean and the standard deviations of prices
and selected product characteristics for the overall sample and for the treated
and control group ones. Prices show a large variability, being the average for
the overall sample $240.43 and the standard deviation $283.53. By comparing
average values observed over the two platforms, it emerges that both prices
and UGC display similar values, thus confirming what has been observed by
the previous literature on the low dispersion of consumer electronics prices
across countries [35]; moreover, such similarities support our approach for the
choice of the control sample. As Table 20 shows, in the case of the treated
sample (NewEgg) the average price during the policy validity period (before
treatment) is about $18 higher with respect to the post implementation pe-
riod.74
In order to investigate the issue of heterogeneity in the effect of PMG
policies on prices, we distinguish products according to products character-
istics recovered from UGC. In particular we classify products depending on
their quality and visibility, measured trough UGC as explained in the previ-
ous section. Given that quality assessment by consumers is highly correlated
to products visibility, in Table 21 we show some descriptive statistics for prod-
ucts classified according to such characteristics.75
Again, data show that products characteristics stemming from UGC are quite
similar across countries/platforms.
73The ranking position of an item is retrieved launching the Google query composed by
the sentence: “the name of product” AND “the name of platform”. The resulting position is
then normalized, mapping in the probability range [0,1].
74We remember that our treatment is the policy shutdown.
75High quality products are those characterized by a rating higher than 4/5, while high
visibility ones are those endowed of a search rank index greater than 0.8.
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Table 19: Summary Statistics. Treated and Control Samples.
Variables Full Sample Amazon UK NewEgg
Provider Price ($) 240.43 227.72 253.15
(283.53) (262.74) (302.39)
Product Popularity (0-1) 0.23 0.26 0.20
(0.27) (0.30) (0.23)
Search Rank (0-1) 0.75 0.85 0.64
(0.30) (0.17) (0.36)
Rating (0-5 stars) 4.14 4.14 4.15
(0.68) (0.48) (0.83)
Table 20: Summary Statistics. NewEgg. Pre and Post Treatment.
Variables Pre Treatment Post Treatment
Provider Price ($) 231.22 209.63
(329.01) (235.21)
Product Popularity (0-1) 0.22 0.19
(0.25) (0.23)
Search Rank (0-1) 0.77 0.71
(0.26) (0.31)
Rating (0-5 stars) 4.16 4.06
(0.98) (1.05)
Notes: The pre-treatment period is the policy implementation period.
Table 21: Summary Statistics. Sub-Samples.
Variables
Low Quality High Quality
Low Search Rank High Search Rank
NewEgg Amazon.uk NewEgg Amazon.uk
Provider Price ($) 206.02 95.81 221.06 161.10
(143.92) (35.11) (354.69) (163.90)
Product Popularity (0-1) 0.01 0.01 0.28 0.29
(0.01) (0.01) (0.25) (0.33)
Search Rank (0-1) 0.19 0.38 0.90 0.91
(0.27) (0.38) (0.04) (0.05)
Rating (0-5 stars) 2.93 3.19 4.40 4.45
(0.71) (0.32) (0.49) (0.20)
Notes: For high quality products we mean those with ratings higher than 4. For high
visibility products we mean those with a normalized search index higher than 0,8.
As far as the PMG policy is concerned, NewEgg adopts a blinking strategy,
so that the policy is applied in a non continuous way, often to the same prod-
ucts. Table 22 shows the total number of days of treatment (absence of PMG)
and the average number of treatments occurred in each sample. This latter
information suggests that, on average, the policy is applied to each product
twice during the sample period (174 days) and such frequency does not seem
to be correlated to products quality and visibility. Indeed, since prices are
highly correlated to quality, we can reasonably assume that there is not selec-
tion into treatment associated to products price or quality (visibility), so that
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the assumption of random assignment required by the identification strategy
seems reasonably fulfilled. On the other side, it seems that, for low quality
(and visibility) products, the policy implementation period is longer.
Table 22: Summary Statistics. PMG.
Variables Full Sample Low Quality High Quality
Low Search Rank High Search Rank
Treatment Duration (days) 38.25 58.13 29.30
(39.94) (43.37) (33.54)
Number of Treatments 2.38 1.81 2.78
(1.75) (0.82) (2.06)
Notes: Treatment duration is the average number of days without PMG. The sample
period includes 174 days.
Another important issue is related to the representativeness of our sample.
Figure 6 represents the distribution of products by price classes (10). The
graph shows that 22 products out of 29 belong to the first two price deciles,
with price ranging between 0$ and 240$. This picture closely matches a typ-
ical distribution observed in consumer electronics [12], often characterized by
a large amount of low cost accessories and few luxury goods. Furthermore,
calculating the log-price distribution (Figure 7) and mapping the integer part
of this value on the x-axis, we obtain a septile-partition. By plotting the distri-
bution of products by log-price classes we obtain a distribution that resembles
the Normal one. Such result is in line with those obtained by Coad [12].
Figure 6: Products Distribution by Price Classes.
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Figure 7: Products Distribution by Log-Price Classes.
4 Identification Strategy
We identify the causal effect of price matching guarantees on price levels,
by comparing prices before and after the policy shutdown for a sample of
products sold by NewEgg (the treatment group), to the prices average change
for the same products sold by Amazon UK (the control group). Indeed, and
crucially for our identification strategy, PMG implemented by NewEgg only
affects products that are sold in US, thereby naturally creating a treatment
and a control group; the same products sold by Amazon UK (that never offers
price warranties) are less likely to be affected by the policy and well represents
a counterfactual sample mimicking what would have happened to prices of
treated products in the absence of PMG. This framework provides a quasi-
natural experiment that allows us to study the causal impact of PMG on
prices through a Diff-in-Diff research design.
This identification approach requires the estimation of the following panel
FE model:76




+XTi,l,tβ + µi,l + τt + εi,l,t (15)
76In a Diff-in-Diff context, a classic model would be built like Y = α + β1(Treated) +
β2(Post) +β3(Treated ∗Post) + ε. In all models we exclude Treated and Post terms, since
they are multicollinear with time and product fixed effects.
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The dependent variable, Pricei,l,t represents the price (natural logarithm)
of good i, on platform l, at time t; Ti,l,t denotes a binary variable equal to
1 for treated goods; Pi,t is a binary variable that is equal to 1 for any day
since the policy shutdown and zero otherwise and εi,l,t is an error term. The
model includes a full set of daily time dummies, τt, accounting for unobserved
time-varying determinants of prices that are common to all goods. Product
fixed effects, µi,l, control for any time invariant unobserved heterogeneity at
the product and platform level, that could be correlated with the included re-
gressors and that could also drive prices. Moreover, the presence of individual
(product) fixed effects in the Diff-in-Diff research design rises the degree of
comparability of treatment and control groups.
We include a set of covariates, Xi,l,t in Equation (15), in order to control
for products characteristics derived by UGC that might affect the outcome
of the PMG policies. The γ coefficient associated to the interaction term
(Ti,l,t ∗ Pi,t) represents the DiD estimate of the effect of PMG shutdown on
treated products prices and it measures the average price differential between
the treated and the control group.
We also explore the issue of heterogeneity in the effect of PMG policies
on prices. Indeed, as discussed in the literature review section, most of the
predictions of theoretical models on the price effects of PMG policies rely on
assumptions related to the presence of heterogeneous consumers. By distin-
guishing products according to consumers quality assessment, we indirectly
assume that consumers are heterogeneous in terms of their preferences to-
wards quality and their availability to pay a price premium for that. Indeed,
for high quality goods the price elasticity of demand is usually assumed to be
lower than the price elasticity for low profile goods. We further classify prod-
ucts according to their visibility, as measured by the search index described
above. We believe that the time spent for finding a product indirectly selects
consumers according to their willingness to engage in search activity and that
such availability is directly correlated to their price sensitiveness.
Based on the above reasoning, we estimate Equation (15) on different sub-
samples built according to product quality and visibility indices. In particular,
we analyse separately high (low) quality products, namely products charac-
terized by rating greater (lower) than 4/5, and products characterised by high
(low) visibility in terms of Google search rank, namely products whose search
index is greater (lower) than 0,8. Moreover, given that products quality and
visibility resulted to be highly correlated, we split the sample according to both
characteristics. As discussed in the Data Section, such products characteristics
do not affect the probability of being treated.
The heterogeneity issue is also investigated with a different approach by
estimating a Triple Difference regression (DDD) on the full sample. In partic-
ular, we estimate the following model:




+XTi,l,tβ + µi,l + τt +ωi,l,t (16)
Equation (16) includes an additional component in the interaction term,
HRHVi,l,t, i.e. a dummy variable assuming value 1 for high quality and high
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visibility products. The coefficient ϕ of the triple interaction measures the
average treatment effect of PMG on prices for high quality (visibility) products.
All specifications are estimated by OLS and Standard Errors are robustly
estimated. Moreover, following Cameron and Miller [8], we compute boot-
strapped standard errors with a cluster structure (at product level) and all
results are confirmed. Finally, we conduct an extensive robustness analysis




In Table 23 and 24 we show DiD estimates; in particular, we first report
results obtained by estimating Equation (15) without including control vari-
ables (Table 23, column (1)), while Table 24 (column (1)) provides estimates
obtained after including all control variables. DiD estimates suggest that the
PMG shutdown triggers a significant reduction of price levels of about 3.9%.
Rather comfortingly, the inclusion of control variables into model (15) does
not significantly affect the result. These findings suggest that, on average,
the adoption of PMG has an anti-competitive effect on prices since, after the
policy validity period, they show a substantial reduction. These results are
consistent with those obtained by Zhuo [38] on a large sample of products ob-
served on the Amazon platform in 2012. However, we follow a rather different
identification strategy. While Zhuo [38] focuses on price changes observed on
the non-adopting platform, before and after the implementation of PMG by
competitors, we focus on price changes observed on the adopting platform.
Moreover, we innovatively build the control sample with platform price data
for the same treated products but observed in another country (UK).
To explore whether product properties affect the impact of PMG on prices,
we split the sample according to different classes of product quality and visi-
bility and we re-estimate Equation (15). Columns from (2) to (5) in Tables 23
and 24 show results of this disaggregated analysis. Estimates indicate that a
policy repeal produces a price reduction for both low and high quality prod-
ucts; however, the estimated coefficients for the low quality sample are not
statistically different from zero, while those for high quality products indicate
a statistically significant price reduction of about 2.5%. When we split the
sample according to values assumed by the search index, results suggest that,
when the PMG is interrupted, products characterised by a low search rank
experience a price increase of roughly 2,4%, while for high visibility products
prices decreases of about 5,3%. These findings support the hypothesis that, in
online consumer electronics market, PMG policies harm competition for high
visible products by keeping prices high, while for low visible products, such
policies have a pro competitive effect on prices.
Indeed, as highlighted in the data section, quality and visibility are highly
correlated in our sample. Hence, we estimate Equation (15) after splitting the
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sample according to both product properties.
Results shown in column (6) and (7) of Table 23 suggest that the PMG shut-
down triggers a reduction of prices for high quality and high visibility products
(3,7%), while prices of low quality and low visibility ones raise of about 3,4%.
These findings are confirmed when we include control variables into the model
(Table 24, columns (6) and (7)) and when we analyse heterogeneous effects
of PMG by means of a Triple Difference regression approach, as shown in
columns (1) and (2) of Table 25.
Table 23: DiD Estimates of the Impact of PMG on Prices.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Products Prices (log) FULL SAMPLE L. RATING H. RATING L. VISIBILITY H. VISIBILITY LR-LV HR-HV
Ti,l,t ∗ Pi,t -0.0401*** -0.0064 -0.0250*** 0.0242*** -0.0543*** 0.0331** -0.0381***
(0.00628) (0.01300) (0.00688) (0.00769) (0.00795) (0.01370) (0.00864)
Observations 9,028 2,896 6,132 2,295 6,733 994 4,864
R-squared 0.986 0.985 0.986 0.990 0.984 0.983 0.983
Controls NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Product Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
F Test 0.000 0.623 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.016 0.000
Notes: All specifications include time and product fixed effects. Controls include product popularity, number of reviews and rating.
High quality products have ratings higher than 4. High visibility products have a normalized search index higher than 0,8. LR-LV are
low rating and low search index products, HR-HV are high rating and high search rank products. Robust Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 24: DiD Estimates of the Impact of PMG on Prices.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Products Prices (log) FULL SAMPLE L. RATING H. RATING L. VISIBILITY H. VISIBILITY LR-LV HR-HV
Ti,l,t ∗ Pi,t -0.0424*** -0.0108 -0.0270*** 0.0322*** -0.0577*** 0.0532*** -0.0398***
(0.00629) (0.01510) (0.00693) (0.00786) (0.00799) (0.01310) (0.00879)
Observations 9,028 2,896 6,132 2,295 6,733 994 4,864
R-squared 0.986 0.986 0.986 0.992 0.985 0.989 0.983
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Product Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
F Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: All specifications include time and product fixed effects. Controls include product popularity, number of reviews and rating. High
quality products have ratings higher than 4. High visibility products have a normalized search index higher than 0,8. LR-LV are low
rating and low search index products, HR-HV are high rating and high search rank products. Robust Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Our empirical findings can be explained by the main predictions of theo-
retical models analysing the impact of PMG on prices and competition.
The anti-competitive effect of PMG observed for high quality (visibility) prod-
ucts has been predicted by theoretical models where such polices make col-
lusion more likely [7; 20; 34]. These findings can be also explained by the
theoretical predictions of a class of models, like Corts [14] and Nalca et al.
[30], where PMG is a tool for discriminating customers according to their sen-
sitiveness to price and products quality. These models also explain our results
obtained for products characterized by low visibility (quality).
Indeed, most of the predictions of theoretical models on the price effects of
PMG policies rely on assumptions related to the presence of heterogeneous
consumers. By classifying products on the base of consumers quality assess-
ment, we indirectly assume that consumers are heterogeneous in terms of their
preferences towards quality and their availability to pay a price premium for
that. Similarly, the time spent for finding a product can indirectly select con-
sumers according to their willingness to engage in search activity and it is
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Table 25: DDD Estimates of the Impact of PMG on Prices.
(1) (2)
Products Prices (log) DDD DDD





Product Dummies YES YES
Time Dummies YES YES
F Test 0.000 0.000
Notes: All specifications include time and prod-
uct fixed effects. Controls include product popular-
ity, number of reviews and rating. HRHVi,l,t is a
dummy equal to 1 for high quality and high visibil-
ity products. Robust Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
reasonable to argue that such availability is directly correlated to price sensi-
tiveness.
5.2 Robustness Analysis
In this section, we discuss empirical results obtained by conducting an in-depth
robustness analysis of our results.
The first issue that we tackle is the possibility that the effects of the treat-
ment speed up, stabilize, or mean revert over time. In order to explore this
issue, we estimate a specification of Eq. (15) that includes lags à la Autor [3]
and takes on the following form:







+XTi,l,tβ + µi,l + τt + εi,l,t (17)
where Pi,t+j assumes the value of 1 in day t+ j , and 0 otherwise.
Specification (17) allows the PMG repeals to generate different effects over
time. In order to lower the number of parameters of the model, we estimate
the effect of a PMG shutdown from the implementation day (j = 0) until five
days later and onward.
According to results shown in Table 26, coefficients related to lagged vari-
ables are always negative and statistically significant for the full sample. How-
ever, point estimates suggest that the impact of the treatment reaches its
maximum after one day and starts decreasing afterwards. Figure 8 graphi-
cally shows parameter estimates patterns.
Another important issue in a DiD research design is the presence of pre-
treatment common trends for treated and control samples. This assumption
is indeed fundamental for the validity of the counterfactual policy evaluation
analysis.
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Table 26: DiD Estimates of the Impact of PMG on Prices with lags à la Autor (2003).
(1) (2)
Products Prices (log) DiD DiD
Ti,l,t ∗ Pi,t+0 -0.0500*** -0.0508**
(0.01610) (0.01610)
Ti,l,t ∗ Pi,t+1 -0.0566*** -0.0577**
(0.01580) (0.01570)
Ti,l,t ∗ Pi,t+2 -0.0558*** -0.0566**
(0.01960) (0.01960)
Ti,l,t ∗ Pi,t+3 -0.0530*** -0.0539**
(0.01990) (0.01990)
Ti,l,t ∗ Pi,t+4 -0.0529*** -0.0531**
(0.02030) (0.02030)





Product Dummies YES YES
Time Dummies YES YES
F Test 0.000 0.000
Notes: All specifications include time and product
fixed effects. Controls include product popularity,
number of reviews and rating. Robust Standard
Errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
Figure 8: DiD Estimates of the Impact of PMG on Prices (Full Sample, with
Controls) with lags à la Autor (2003).
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Figure 9: Price Differentials Between Treated and Control Groups Before the PMG
Shutdown.
In order to explore this issue, we show in Figure 9 point estimates values and
the relative confidence intervals of the difference in the level of prices between
treated and control products from five days before the treatment to the day
of the policy shutdown.77 Plotted point estimates suggest that price levels for
the treated platform do not seem to be significantly different from prices of
the control platform before the treatment. This result provides evidence in
favor of the validity of parallel trends assumption for our samples.
In order to further analyse this issue, we follow Autor [3] and we estimate
Eq. (17) after including some leads of the treatment interaction variable:







+XTi,l,tβ + µi,l + τt + εi,l,t (18)
If leads coefficients turn out to be statistically significant, there may be
anticipatory effects and a failure in the parallel trend assumption. According
to Table 27 and Figure 10, estimated coefficients of the anticipatory effects
are not statistically significant, thus providing further evidence in favor of the
existence of a parallel trend between treatment and control sample.
In order to extend our robustness analysis, we implement a complete set of
placebo tests. We first estimate our baseline and DDD specifications by intro-
77In order to obtain these values, we estimate a panel model where we regress average daily
price differences between the two samples on lead terms for five days before the treatment.
We control for product fixed effects and daily fixed effects.
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Table 27: DiD Estimates of the Impact of PMG on Prices with Leads à la Autor (2003).
(1) (2)
Products Prices (log) DiD DiD
Ti,l,t ∗ Pi,t−1 -0.0121 -0.0117
(0.0187) (0.0187)
Ti,l,t ∗ Pi,t−2 0.0030 0.0040
(0.0181) (0.0181)
Ti,l,t ∗ Pi,t−3 0.0067 0.0076
(0.0191) (0.0191)
Ti,l,t ∗ Pi,t−4 0.0155 0.0162
(0.0199) (0.0198)





Product Dummies YES YES
Time Dummies YES YES
F Test 0.842 0.000
Notes: All specifications include time and
product fixed effects. Controls include prod-
uct popularity, number of reviews and rating.
Robust Standard Errors in parentheses ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Figure 10: DiD Estimates of the Impact of PMG on Prices (Full sample, with
Controls) with Leads à la Autor (2003).
ducing artificially timed treatments and artificially treated subjects. Subjects
and treatments fake assignments are drawn from two Bernoulli distributions
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with parameters p (probability of success) derived from the sample distribu-
tions of Treatedi,l,t and Posti,t respectively. Within this setting, we should not
observe any significant effect of PMG repeals on prices. Comfortingly, results
reported in Table 28 confirm this prediction.
Next, we conduct another falsification test by estimating our models after sub-
stituting the dependent variable with a placebo outcome that should not be
affected by PMG shutdown. In particular, we generate fake product prices
drawn by random distributions resembling sample ones (same mean and vari-
ance). Results shown in Table 29 confirm the absence of any impact of PMG
repeals on fake outcome.
Table 28: DiD and DDD Estimates of the Impact of Fake Implementation Period on
Prices for Fake Treated/Control Samples.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Products Prices (log) DiD DiD DDD DDD
Ti,l,t ∗ Pi,t(Fake) 0.0018 0.0019
(0.00262) (0.00261)
Ti,l,t ∗ Pi,t ∗HRHVi,l,t(Fake) 0.0033 0.0033
(0.00403) (0.00403)
Observations 9,028 9,028 9,028 9,028
R-squared 0.986 0.986 0.986 0.986
Controls NO YES NO YES
Product Dummies YES YES YES YES
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES
F Test 0.502 0.000 0.418 0.000
Notes: All specifications include time and product fixed effects. Controls include
product popularity, number of reviews and rating. Robust Standard Errors in in
parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In order to analyze if our main results are robust to the exclusion of a
particular product we estimate the baseline model (15) after dropping one
product at a time. Results suggest that this is not the case and confirm
all previous findings.78 In the same spirit, we estimate equation (15) after
balancing the panel dataset and all results are confirmed.79 Finally, it is worth
noting that results do not change if we compute bootstrapped standard errors
at product level.
6 Conclusions
In this work we empirically investigate the effects of Price Matching Guaran-
tees (PMG) commercial policies on U.S. online consumer electronics prices by
78Results, not reported, are available from the authors upon request.
79Precisely, we drop first 34 days in which we observe only some products; results are
available upon request.
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Table 29: DiD and DDD Estimates of the Impact of PMG on Fake Prices.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fake Products Prices (log) DiD DiD DDD DDD
Ti,l,t ∗ Pi,t -0.0011 -0.0011
(0.00154) (0.00154)
Ti,l,t ∗ Pi,t ∗HRHVi,l,t -0.0013 -0.0013
(0.00203) (0.00204)
Observations 9,028 9,028 9,028 9,028
R-squared 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
Controls NO YES NO YES
Product Dummies YES YES YES YES
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES
F Test 0.466 0.722 0.516 0.746
Notes: All specifications include time and product fixed effects. Controls in-
clude product popularity, number of reviews and rating. Robust Standard
Errors in in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
applying a Difference-in-Difference research design.
Estimates conducted over a sample of product prices, observed on the
NewEgg platform between May and October 2018, provide evidence in fa-
vor of an average price reduction of about 3.9% after the interruption of the
PMG policy. In order to have a more detailed picture of the issue, we in-
vestigate if such effect is heterogeneous across products. In particular, we
focus on products features that might affect the outcome of PMG policies
and that can be recovered exclusively on online markets. Platform data allow
us to obtain information from User Generated Contents (UGC), like product
popularity, product quality and online search visibility (Google Search Rank);
indeed, we believe that these product characteristics might provide indirect
information on consumers heterogeneity. Estimates conducted on specific sub-
samples show that when PMG are interrupted, low quality (low search rank)
products experience a price increase of about 3.4%, while for high quality (high
visibility) products a price reduction of about 3.7% is observed.
These findings are in line with the lack of unambiguous predictions of the
theoretical literature and are consistent with models predicting anti-competitive
effects of PMG policies and with those interpreting such policies as a price dis-
criminating device. Theoretical models predicting anti-competitive effects of
PMG, suggest that such policies might induce higher prices in oligopoly mar-
kets (as the online consumer electronics) by sustaining collusion. In particular,
online retailing platforms can easily monitor competitors prices trough price-
tracking systems and can react faster to price signals, if compared to brick
and mortar retailers. This possibility might sustain collusion by decreasing
information asymmetries among competitors and reducing detection lags. On
the other side, buyers’ sensitivity to product quality and the willingness to en-
gage in search activity can indirectly identify those customers whose demand
is more rigid, thus allowing price discrimination practices. Indeed, e-commerce
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allows platforms to easily recover information on buyers, thanks also to UGC,
thus favoring discrimination policies.
Models that predict anti-competitive effects of PMG on prices are well
suited to explain the results for high quality and visible products. The demand
of such products is high and stable and consumers are likely to be available
to pay a price premium. Such features, together with easily detectable price
signals,make collusion more sustainable. Thus, PMG policies might be an in-
vitation to collude that can be quickly and easily captured by competitors.
However, it is worth noting that our analysis does not allows us to support
such theoretical interpretation of the results since we do not analyse NewEggs
competitors’ behavior.
Our empirical results are also consistent with theoretical models arguing that
PMG act as price discrimination tools. Indeed, such theoretical explanation
requires a significant percentage of consumers invoking PMG rights; unfortu-
nately, we do not have data on PMG redemption frequency. However, Moor-
thy and Winter [28] find redemption rates ranging between 5% and 25% on
a sample of 46 retailers operating in the United States and in Canada. It is
reasonable to assume that online markets redemption rates can be similar to
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Table 30: Sub-Categories List.
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Table 31: Products List.
Products Titles
AMD Ryzen 5 1500X Processor
Corsair Crystal Series 570X RGB - Tempered Glass; Premium ATX Mid-Tower Case
BlackBerry PRIV (32GB) Verizon Factory Unlocked Phone
Fujitsu fi-7160 Color Duplex Document Scanner
Fujitsu ScanSnap S1300i Instant PDF Multi Sheet-Fed Scanner
Philips BT50B/37 Wireless Portable Bluetooth Speaker
Asus ROG MAXIMUS VIII FORMULA DDR4 ATX Motherboards
ASUS VS247H-P 23.6 Full HD 1920x1080 2ms HDMI DVI VGA Monitor
Samsung Hmd Odyssey Windows Mixed Reality Headset
Samsung 128GB BAR (METAL) USB 3.0 Flash Drive
Corsair CW-9060025-WW Hydro Series Liquid CPU Cooler
Echo Dot (2nd Generation) - Smart speaker with Alexa - Black
ASUS VivoMini Mini PC
Dell XF9PJ Latitude 7490 Notebook
Intel Core i7-8700 Desktop Processor 6 Cores
AMD Ryzen 7 2700X Processor Wraith Prism LED Cooler
Corsair RMx Series RM850 x 80 PLUS Gold Fully Modular ATX Power Supply
ASUS 24-inch Full HD FreeSync Gaming Monitor
Brother Monochrome Laser Printer; Compact All-in One Printer
Team 64GB microSDXC UHS-I/U1 Class 10 Memory Card with Adapter
LG Electronics 21.5 Screen LED-Lit Monitor
HP LaserJet Pro M227fdw All-in-One Wireless Laser Printer
Logitech Z313 Speaker System + Logitech Bluetooth Audio Adapter Bundle
PNY CS900 960GB 2.5 Sata III Internal Solid State Drive (SSD)
Samsung SmartThings ADT Wireless Home Security Starter Kit
Samsung SmartThings Smart Home Hub
Rosewill 2U Server Chassis Server Case (RSV-2600)
Corsair Apple Certified 16GB (2 x 8GB) DDR3 1333 MHz (PC3 10600) Laptop Memory
Acer Iconia One 10 NT.LDPAA.003 10.1-Inch Tablet
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